The migration of unskilled youth: Is there any wage gain?



provided by Research Papers in Economics


THE MIGRATION OF UNSKILLED YOUTH:

Is There Any Wage Gain?

Cécile Détang-Dessendre, Carine Drapier and Hubert Jayet*

1 Introduction

Over the life cycle, entry into labour force is the period where geographic mobility is highest.
Moreover, it is mainly driven by employment motives, while elder people often migrate in search of
better amenities (Van Ommeren et alii, 1996; Détang-Dessendre et alii, 1999 ; Zax, 1991). Thus,
young labour force entrants are an interesting population for the analysis of the links between job
markets and migrations. These links can be analysed from several points of view. One may choose to
consider employment and migration choices as the outcome of human capital investment decisions
(Sjaastad, 1962 ; Greenwood, 1975, 1985). Alternatively, one may be interested in the effects of
differences among local labour markets with respect to wages, unemployment, job mobility (Kriaa et
Plassard, 1997). We can also examine how firms hiring and labour force management policies induce
migrations.

This papers starts from the idea that migration by labour force entrants is the outcome of a search
process for jobs. At typical job search process implies a succession of job offers, each offer
characterised by a wage drawn from a random distribution (Lippman and McCall, 1976). The
searcher's strategy is characterised by a reservation wage, the first offer exceeding it being accepted.
The spatial dimension of these search processes is often neglected. A labour force entrant may migrate
because, before looking for jobs, he chooses to locate on the labour market wherein returns to search
are highest. Alternatively, he may stay at his origin place when searching, looking for jobs on several
labour markets. He migrates if the first acceptable offer is not a local one.

Whenever the agent moves before or after searching, spatial search implies differences between jobs
accepted by migrants and non migrants. The agent does not face the same wage distribution nor the
same search costs when he looks for jobs located outside his local labour market. He changes his
reservation wages accordingly. Then, one may expect wages distributions to differ between migrants
and non migrants. In section 2, we analyse the main factors that are behind these differences.

* Cécile Détang-Dessendre, INRA, Dijon, Error! Bookmark not defined. ; Carine Drapier and Hubert Jayet,
MEDEE, Lille University of Science and Technology,
Error! Bookmark not defined.. We acknowledge an
important debt to the CEREQ (Centre for Research on Employment and Skills). They gave us the data used in this



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