How we might be able to understand the brain



Provided by Cognitive Sciences ePrint Archive


How we might be able to
understand the brain

Brian D. Josephson

Department of Physics

University of Cambridge

Cambridge, UK

http://www. tcm.phy. cam. ac. uk/~bdj1 0

Abstract:

Current methodologies in the neurosciences have difficulty in accounting for complex
phenomena such as language, which can however be quite well characterised in
phenomenological terms. This paper addresses the issue of unifying the two approaches. We
typically understand complicated systems in terms of a collection of models, each
characterisable in principle within a formal system, it being possible to explain higher-level
properties in terms of lower level ones by means of a series of inferences based on these
models. We consider the nervous system to be a mechanism for implementing the demands of
an appropriate collection of models, each concerned with some aspect of brain and behaviour,
the observer mechanism of Baas playing an important role in matching model and behaviour in
this context. The discussion expounds these ideas in detail, showing their potential utility in
connection with real problems of brain and behaviour, important areas where the ideas can be
applied including the development of higher levels of abstraction, and linguistic behaviour, as
described in the works of Karmiloff-Smith and Jackendoff respectively.

Keywords: nervous system, brain modelling, language, hyperstructure, representational
redescription, emergence.

(c) B D Josephson 2004



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