Aliki Mouriki
social partners for more radical reforms that will be able to address the huge challenges ahead. How-
ever, as power relations between the main players always determine the outcome of the negotiations,
the strength of business vis-à-vis organised labour will undermine the fairness and sustainability of
this new deal, unless the state assumes its role as an arbiter and ensures a positive interaction between
the different players with no winners and losers.
Last, but not least, those EU countries that are lagging behind need to come to terms with
the bare truth that struggling to remain competitive in the world economy as low-cost production
countries is not an option anymore. Lowering labour costs will not make business more viable or
more competitive, as the gap in wages and in employment conditions of the other low cost countries
outside the EU is huge and widening. What could increase the competitiveness of these economies
would be increased investment in the knowledge society, in innovation and in human capital.
As a final point, and coming back to the initial questions raised in the introduction of this work,
we can sum up are conclusions in a nut shell:
a) The flexicurity policy agenda is best suited to countries with good economic performance, ro-
bust institutions and a consensus culture. In this sense, it definitely constitutes a step forward
from aggressive (and one-sided) neo-liberal and deregulation policies.
b) Its relevance for countries with structural weaknesses, weak institutions and a poor social
partnership approach is highly questionable. Alternative and more appropriate strategies -tai-
lored to the particular national idiosyncrasies- need to be designed and pursued.
c) Even in countries with a success record, there are winners and losers in the process of im-
plementation of the flexicurity agenda. Uneven trade-offs reinforce the divides within the
workforce, lead to new inequalities and threaten social cohesion, as well as the viability of the
European Social Model.
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