Flexibility and security: an asymmetrical relationship?
Arriving at a “win-win” solution for both sides implies accepting sacrifices on behalf of both
negotiating parties, not only labour, and this cannot only result from a process of hard, but fair
bargaining, a “quid pro quo”: firms relinquish some of the desired flexibility and workers relinquish
some degree of job protection, pay compensation, or employment right. It is not unusual, when ne-
gotiations arrive at a deadlock or face difficulties, to down-play some of the problems, or even worst,
hide them “under the rag”, only to see them re-emerge more saliently on the first occasion.
Trade-offs need to take place both at the macro-level (institutions), as well as the micro-level (com-
panies and organizations). Unless backed up by state policies and finance, concessions from either
workers or companies, cannot be sustainable. At the aggregate level a common trade off is between
job security and employment security: a low degree of employment protection is offset by generous
unemployment insurance and effective active labour market measures. 18 Increased flows between
employment and unemployment become more acceptable to workers if the level of unemployment
compensation is satisfactory and if there exist opportunities for upgrading the skills of the unem-
ployed. Another example of a negotiated trade-off at the macro-level is the relaxation in dismissal
protection legislation for regular employees in exchange for a stricter regulation of temporary agency
work.
At the micro-level, trade-offs between employers and employees can take several forms. The
most common are:
• the provision by companies of various types of leave to their workforce (parental, educa-
tional, personal) in return for state subsidies;
• greater working time flexibility, in return for safeguarding jobs;
• greater functional flexibility (multi-skilling, task rotation), in return for job security;
• the reduction of working hours in return for working hours flexibility and reduced pre-
mium pay for overtime work.
18 Inversely, in different institutional environments, a strict employment protection legislation (especially for standard
employees) is usually counter-balanced by minimal unemployment insurance, poor activation policies and few training
opportunities.
Page • 35
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