The name is absent

Aliki Mouriki

iii) external pressures, like the need to comply with the EMU criteria or with the guidelines of the
European Employment Strategy, undoubtedly led to significant changes in the consultation
process in Spain and Greece, but were not sufficient in triggering off a process of imitation
in view of replicating the successful trajectory of negotiated change of Denmark and the
Netherlands.

Individualism vs. communalism

An extensive literature that examines the interaction between economic development and culture
pays particular attention to the question of how the orientation of a society towards individualism or
collectivism is affected by and in turn determines the course of economic development.

Weber had stressed the importance of Protestantism, and its emphasis on rational thought and
the pursuit of individual interests over communal ties in “shattering the fetters of kinship group”
and triggering off economic growth (Weber in Bell, 2001). According to this line of argument, many
scholars have argued that the extended family and other traditional networks can become an obstacle
to economic development because, by providing a safety net to its members (informal insurance), it
deters them from taking risks and accumulating wealth. Similarly, strong family or community ties can
also interfere with the functioning of the economy, as personal relationships tend to override the al-
legiance to impersonal institutions and to abstract moral concepts, thus encouraging favouritism and
nepotism (Plateau, Lewis and Tanzi, in Bell, 2001).

By contrast, the literature on social capital and trust emphasizes the economic benefits of collec-
tivism and stresses the importance of social networks and trust in the creation of prosperity, making
the point that the absence of mutual trust can explain much of the economic backwardness. This
literature investigates, in particular, how and to what extent social norms can induce people to behave
in socially beneficial ways, i.e. to cooperate, if this does not maximize their material self-interest. One
such norm is the “reciprocity” norm that encourages “conditional cooperation”: “people like to help
those who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them” (Rabin, in Bell, 2001). Accord-
ing to Putnam, “voluntary cooperation is easier in a community that has inherited a substantial stock
of social capital, in the form of norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (Putnam, in
Bell, 2001). These stocks of social capital tend to be self-reinforcing, producing high levels of coop-
eration, trust, reciprocity and civic engagement and eventually, collective well-being. Conversely, the

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