harshness and ruthlessness with which government reacted to social pro-
tests. We do not argue that PRSP participation has sparkled the conflicts
over water and coca, but we find it striking that donors who find participa-
tion so important turned a blind eye to what was happening outside the
PRSP participation show.
Regarding ownership, the reality of Bolivia and elsewhere is that the
donor community, swayed by the idea that government-ownership of both
the PRSP and the participation process is utterly important, gives govern-
ments a free hand in setting up a participation format. Bolivian govern-
ment organized the process in such a way that it turned the heat away from
fundamental political issues and macro-economic frameworks. Government
ownership therefore impeded ownership in the broadest and most consensu-
al sense of the concept. Broad based ownership over the PRSP has not been
achieved in Bolivia. The civil society organizations that participated were
and remain largely opposed to the strategy. In order to ensure the goals of
broader country ownership and increased government accountability, some
NGOs suggested the need for clear and strict guidelines or standards for
participation (Bank-Fund Staff 2002:12).
In our view the effectiveness of the PRSP is not warranted. The
absence of geographical variables in assessing economic sustainability is
difficult to justify in a country like Bolivia. The government furthermore
made too optimistic growth projections, and, the PRSP does not set out
clear priorities. So, when the going gets tough, there is no knowing how the
government is going to heed its promises. It will have to make hard political
choices and there is no telling how civil society will react to those choices.
But much of PRSP was not touched by the participation process. Where it
did, it is far from sure that effectiveness was enhanced. The Bolivia case il-
lustrates that participation is not always the preferred solution when it comes
to matters of poverty. Given the need for pro-poor outcomes it is both neces-
sary and legitimate to steer and manipulate participation to some extent.
Two important resources legitimize the manipulation of the process in favor
of the result (which in this case is poverty reduction). The first resource is
technical and specialized knowledge. The fundamental question is whether
all actors have the same weight when highly technical matters are being
discussed? We argue that technical expertise should be used to make sure
that the voices of the poor can be heard. This can have to go at the expense
of open participation where the not so poor usually dominate. The second re-
source is moral. Special weight should be given to those issues that may not
be backed by large groups (like giving voice to minorities or giving special
consideration to voiceless, unorganized groups like the poor, the indigenous
sectors, but also environment, gender). The conclusion that follows from
this line of thought is that those who participate may be different from those
who are consulted and heard. Different participatory schemes related to the
different stakeholders should therefore be drawn out beforehand and, for ef-
fectiveness’ sake, in function of the desired outcome.
30 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2002-05