Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO Agricultural Negotiations



For countries without reduction commitments, the limit is the de minimis level (for
developing countries, 10% of the value of production of the commodity). There are also
several countries in this group where the PS-AMS levels are close to the 10% limit, but on the
whole levels are relatively low. As Sharma (2002) remarks: “In general terms, 10% of the
value of production (not value-added) is a large amount for most major commodities to
constrain product-specific subsidies”.

Non-product-specific support (NPS-AMS). Sharma (2002) notes that, of the 22 developing
countries with AMS information, only 11 have data on NPS-AMS. There are only two cases
(India and Peru) where the ratio of NPS-AMS to the value of total agricultural production is
high (7.5% and 6.2% respectively). The (unweighted) average for the other 11 countries was
1.9%. The high percentages for India and Peru are partly because neither country made use of
the Article 6.2 provisions designed to cover certain types of developing country expenditures.

Article 6.2 measures. Article 6.2 provides scope to subsidise particular development measures
in agriculture including investment subsidies generally available to agriculture, agricultural
input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor (LI/RP) farmers, as well
as to encourage diversification from growing illicit narcotic crops. Twenty-three developing
WTO members have made use of this provision in one or more years since 1995. Only three
countries (Malaysia, Morocco and Turkey) have outlays exceeding 2% of the value of total
agricultural production, five countries are between 1-2% and the other 15 countries less than
1% (Sharma, 2002).

We conclude that the existing commitments on domestic subsidies have not been a constraint
on developing country policies until now. Developing countries generally do not have the
budgetary means to provide significant support to their farmers.

Yet despite these existing provisions, many developing countries argue that there is a need for
greater flexibility and additional exemptions. In a June 2000 submission to the WTO
Committee on Agriculture, eleven countries - Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Haiti, Honduras, Kenya, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zimbabwe - suggested
creating a Development Box to allow developing countries the flexibility to tackle food
security (G/AG/NG/W/13). This was elaborated in a non-paper on special and differential
treatment submitted by broadly the same group of countries in July 2001
3 and in a subsequent
non-paper on the Development Box by some members of the group in February 2002.
4 A
further paper by the same group put forward specific proposals on modalities for special and
differential treatment provisions.
5 India also submitted a proposal for a Food Security Box in
January 2001 covering much of the same ground (G/AG/NG/W/102). At the WTO Ministerial
Council meeting in Doha in November 2001, a loose alignment of countries calling
themselves the
‘Friends of the Development Box’ was formed to promote acceptance of these
ideas.
6 Development NGOs were also active in making the case for a Development Box
(Green and Priyadarshi, 2001; Oxfam International, 2002; Solagral, 2001). A summary of the
main ideas proposed for the Development Box is shown in Box 1.

3 WTO, Non-Paper on Special and Differential Treatment in Agriculture - Establishing the Objectives,
submitted by Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, Special Session of the
Committee on Agriculture, July 2001.

4 WTO, Non-Paper on ‘The Development Box’, Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture, 4-8
February 2002 (
www.tradeobservatory.org).

5 WTO, Proposals on modalities for further commitments in the area of market access, Special Session
of the Committee on Agriculture, 2-3 September 2002 (
www.tradeobservatory.org).

6 Cuba; Dominican Republic; El Salvador; Haiti; Honduras; Kenya; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru;
Senegal; Sri Lanka; Uganda; Zimbabwe.



More intriguing information

1. Structural Influences on Participation Rates: A Canada-U.S. Comparison
2. Word searches: on the use of verbal and non-verbal resources during classroom talk
3. The name is absent
4. Optimal Rent Extraction in Pre-Industrial England and France – Default Risk and Monitoring Costs
5. Empirical Calibration of a Least-Cost Conservation Reserve Program
6. The name is absent
7. Thresholds for Employment and Unemployment - a Spatial Analysis of German Regional Labour Markets 1992-2000
8. Iconic memory or icon?
9. Competition In or For the Field: Which is Better
10. fMRI Investigation of Cortical and Subcortical Networks in the Learning of Abstract and Effector-Specific Representations of Motor Sequences
11. The name is absent
12. Restructuring of industrial economies in countries in transition: Experience of Ukraine
13. Improvements in medical care and technology and reductions in traffic-related fatalities in Great Britain
14. A Principal Components Approach to Cross-Section Dependence in Panels
15. Lumpy Investment, Sectoral Propagation, and Business Cycles
16. Self-Help Groups and Income Generation in the Informal Settlements of Nairobi
17. The Making of Cultural Policy: A European Perspective
18. Evolutionary Clustering in Indonesian Ethnic Textile Motifs
19. Electricity output in Spain: Economic analysis of the activity after liberalization
20. The name is absent