This paper has highlighted where changes in the treatment of developing countries in the AoA
would be desirable in the areas of tariffs, safeguards and domestic supports. In the case of
tariffs, a lower rate of tariff reduction for a limited number of food security products, with a
minimum threshold below which countries would not be required to go, at least until there
had been a much more significant dismantling of agricultural protection in developed
countries, would be justified. Countries whose bound tariffs were already below this
minimum threshold have the right under existing WTO rules to raise these tariffs, although
with the payment of compensation in terms of additional market access elsewhere to those
import suppliers adversely affected. Developed countries might agree to exercise restraint in
seeking compensation in the case of food security crops.
A special agricultural safeguard measure on a permanent basis for developing countries is
justified, particularly in the case of food security products. Technical discussions will be
needed on the design of this mechanism with respect to trigger levels, duration and the level
of additional duties which would be permitted.
On domestic support, the exemptions under Article 6.2 should be maintained and, if
necessary, broadened. With a sufficiently generous interpretation of permitted support
measures, then the current de minimis percentages for developing countries should be
maintained, but not increased. The justification for maintaining the higher percentages is in
recognition of the much higher levels of trade-distorting support permitted to developed
countries under the current rules. But seeking an increase in these percentages is not likely to
result in a commercially valuable concession, given the difficult budgetary situation in most
developing countries.
Finally, there is the question of which countries would be eligible for S&D treatment. Here,
the approach proposed by the IPC to adapt a per capita income based distinction but to allow
countries which feel they have particular vulnerabilities (for example, a high proportion of
people undernourished or a great dependence on a single or narrow range of commodity
exports) to petition for more favourable treatment, is a promising one to pursue.
Comparing these recommendations with the text agreed in the Framework for the modalities
shows a high degree of overlap. The Framework recognises a category of Special Products
based on criteria of food security, livelihood security and rural development needs which will
be eligible for more flexible treatment. The concept of a minimum threshold below which
further tariff reductions would not be required does not appear explicitly, but could be
incorporated into the treatment agreed for SPs. The Framework text also commits to the
establishment of a Special Safeguard Mechanism for use by developing countries, but is silent
on the scope and mechanics of such a mechanism.
On domestic support, the August 2004 Framework calls for reductions in de minimis taking
into account the principle of S&D treatment. This is interpreted in the next sentence as
meaning that developing countries that allocate almost all de minimis programmes for
subsistence and resource-poor farmers will be exempt [from these reduction commitments]. It
proposes to maintain access to Article 6.2 provisions but not to extend them. It also proposes
to allow access to the S&D treatment provisions for export subsidies for a time-limited period
after all other export subsidies have been phased out.
Thus, the potential exists in the Framework Agreement to take a significant step towards
“operationally effective and meaningful provisions” for S&D treatment. While noting this
positive outcome, the important objective for developing countries of gaining a reduction in
the trade-distorting support and protection by developed countries should not be forgotten.
The danger for developing countries is that if too much of their negotiating effort is put into
gaining special and differential treatment, less attention will be paid to gaining significant
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