Sector Switching: An Unexplored Dimension of Firm Dynamics in Developing Countries



5.2 Sector switching and exit

We present the first set of results from the random effects probit models of sector
switching and exit in Table 9, including firm specific explanatory variables only.28 The
first columns in both the sector switching and exit specification include the weighted
relative efficiency score together with province, sector and time dummies. As expected,
we find a significant negative relationship between a firm’s relative efficiency and
sector switching as well as exit. Less (more) productive firms are more (less) likely to
switch sector or close down.

Controlling for firm size and age does not qualitatively change the relative efficiency
result, and both control variables have the expected (and well-determined) sign in the
sector switching specification. Older and larger firms are more likely to remain non-
switchers in accordance with the predictions of traditional firm life-cycle theories. Firm
size has the expected negative sign in both the switching and exit specifications, and
firm age affects switching negatively, so younger firms are more likely to switch. Yet,
firm age is positive and significant (contrary to the hypothesized effect) in the second
exit regression, where ownership is not controlled for. The ongoing reform process (and
the general legal restructuring of the business sector) is key in explaining this. Older
firms tend to be SOEs, and many are exiting in the reform process. This corresponds
with the fact that the effect of firm age is no longer well-determined in the exit
specification once we control for legal ownership type (column (3)).

Ownership structure matters for both the sector switching and exit decision, and - as
hypothesized - state and foreign owned enterprises are less likely to switch than
domestic privately owned firms. Similarly, in the exit specification foreign owned firms
are as expected less likely to exit, whereas state owned firms show the opposite
tendency. Exit is significantly associated with state ownership, and this is, as just noted,
rooted in the ongoing reform process discussed by CIEM (2003).

In the final specification the efficiency variable is only well-determined in the exit
specification. This suggests that relative efficiency is critical in the exit decision, but is
less of a driving factor behind switching, once other characteristics are accounted for.

28 Results of the conditional fixed effects logit are presented in Appendix Table D.

19



More intriguing information

1. A Unified Model For Developmental Robotics
2. LIMITS OF PUBLIC POLICY EDUCATION
3. Asymmetric transfer of the dynamic motion aftereffect between first- and second-order cues and among different second-order cues
4. Antidote Stocking at Hospitals in North Palestine
5. A multistate demographic model for firms in the province of Gelderland
6. EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
7. Gender and headship in the twenty-first century
8. From music student to professional: the process of transition
9. Evaluation of the Development Potential of Russian Cities
10. Valuing Farm Financial Information
11. Foreign Direct Investment and Unequal Regional Economic Growth in China
12. Explaining Growth in Dutch Agriculture: Prices, Public R&D, and Technological Change
13. Sustainability of economic development and governance patterns in water management - an overview on the reorganisation of public utilities in Campania, Italy, under EU Framework Directive in the field of water policy (2000/60/CE)
14. Langfristige Wachstumsaussichten der ukrainischen Wirtschaft : Potenziale und Barrieren
15. Revisiting The Bell Curve Debate Regarding the Effects of Cognitive Ability on Wages
16. THE RISE OF RURAL-TO-RURAL LABOR MARKETS IN CHINA
17. IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING AID PROGRAMS TO U.S. AGRICULTURE
18. A Note on Costly Sequential Search and Oligopoly Pricing (new title: Truly Costly Sequential Search and Oligopolistic Pricing,)
19. TINKERING WITH VALUATION ESTIMATES: IS THERE A FUTURE FOR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT MEASURES?
20. The Triangular Relationship between the Commission, NRAs and National Courts Revisited