Institutions, Social Norms, and Bargaining Power:
An Analysis of Individual Leisure Time in Couple Households
ABSTRACT
We exploit time use data from Denmark and the United States to examine the impact
institutions and social norms have on individuals’ bargaining power within a household,
hypothesizing that the more generous social welfare system and more egalitarian social norms
in Denmark will mitigate the impact standard economic power measures have upon couples’
time use. Further we posit that leisure time will be more sensitive to power considerations
than housework time which may be more influenced by preferences regarding household
public goods, to gendered notions of time use, and to censoring. Our results are generally
supportive of these hypotheses, with leisure time on non-work days in the US being
particularly responsive to economic power. In addition, we find some evidence that
institutions matter as women in the US who are more likely to receive welfare benefits enjoy
more leisure time than would be suggested by their economic power alone.
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