2. Set-up as a public-private partnership with a limited number of members eases deci-
sion making and allows a professional management. The principal agent problem be-
tween management and the associates of the partnership could be minimized because
the executive manager, who grew up in Dolina Strugu, is subject to supervision by a
board of trustees and was already involved in the telephone cooperative. The associ-
ates are a small group of local inhabitants who already cooperated successfully
within the telephone cooperative. This enabled a professional management and cir-
cumvented the problem of individual reservations against cooperation so prevalent in
the rural society. The engagement of local governments as guarantors greatly eased
the funding problem of the public-private partnership.
3. Complementary services offered to farmers provide incentives for a long-term busi-
ness relation and serve as quality control mechanism. The non-profit organization
“Dolina Strugu” provides farmers with complementary assistance in applying for EU
programmes, which is particularly important for the high number of part-time farm-
ers. From “Chmielnik Zdroj”, farmers receive assistance in applying for ecological
certification, which also works as an additional quality control system for the market-
ing partnership.
4. True bottom-up approach secures support and trust of the local population. The en-
gagement of associates of “Chmielnik Zdroj” in the telephone cooperative served as
a reputation-generating mechanism toward the local community. It was particularly
well received that the telephone company gave a share of their profits to the local
community by offering them free local calls. Moreover, 10% of the profits from the
partnership go to the local welfare organization “Caritas”. This is stated on all prod-
uct labels and improves the local trust as well. Local trust can be recognized by the
fact that vehicle drivers of the partnership have the key to many houses or flats of
their clients in Dolina Strugu and other regions to deliver them when they are absent.
The trust in the local leaders and the non-profit organization also became visible in
our case study interviews. Table 1 summarizes the results of a small survey we made
in Dolina Strugu region in summer 2005, where we asked people to fill a question-
naire concerning trust in different national and local institutions. It shows that the
trust in representatives of the local institutions (members of the non-profit organiza-
tion and the mayor) is way higher than in national institutions.
Table 1: Trust of local inhabitants in different national or regional institutions
_____A lot |
A bit |
Rather not |
Not at all |
_N | |
President (%) |
4 |
50 |
32 |
14 |
28 |
Government (%) |
0 |
25 |
40 |
35 |
28 |
Local Administration (%) |
0 |
39 |
54 |
7 |
28 |
Members of the non-profit org.1) (%) |
12 |
65 |
24 |
0 |
17 |
Mayor (%) |
0 |
63 |
26 |
11 |
27 |
Notes: 1) Remaining 12 respondents said they have not enough knowledge about the non-profit organisation to
answer this question.
5.4 Limitations
The public private-partnership had little positive impact in the following areas:
1. Vitalisation of the rural civil society has been limited. Due to its slim management
structures, the partnership has had little effect on harnessing the broader civil society
for rural development. Besides some rural women circles in small villages, with
mostly older members, associations or clubs contributing to regional identification or
development are practically absent. This situation is worsened by a perceived myopia
of local inhabitants as a result of the poor social and economic situation. People still