as the expected ones and the scores of all coefficients were significant at 10% level; the
scores of 80% of them were significant at 1% level. The slogan, “low cost production”,
which had been promoted during the 1980s and until now, was surely realized in
bureaucrats’ seemingly discretionary allocations. The crucial reason is suspected to be
inherently in accordance with the market mechanism.
QUALITY showed a relatively fuzzy disposition between that of the variable,
COST, and that of the variable, FTF.
In short, Table 3 suggests that, among various factors which are publicly
announced as those used in the calculation of allocations, those which naturally reflect
the normal market situation are influential even after being revised in the political
process, while those, the features of which are contrary to the market mechanism, are
suspected to become less influential after political revision. In particular, it is suggested
that the latter factors, such as the share of full-time professional farmers, may be
emasculated in the political process, irrespective of bureaucrats’ initial intention.
Discussion
Change of the model’s explanatory power
The change of the model’s explanatory power, which was typically observed in
time-series change of scores of the adjusted R square, can be well explained by the
policy change during this period.
At the beginning of this program, the ratio of set-aside acreage to production area
was not so large. Therefore, farmers’ grievances themselves might not have been so
serious. Furthermore, bureaucrats had taken a relatively high-handed stance towards
prefectures in order to fulfill the targeted reduction. As a result, it is likely that the
explanatory power of the model is not so high under a combination of lower political
pressure and bureaucrats’ stronger inclination for discretionary decision-making.
However, in the middle of the observation period, government had to force farmers
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