Interest groups, especially agricultural cooperatives, are reluctant to promote this policy
direction because the majority of farmers in Japanese rural society are part-time farmers.
Politicians also hesitate to support this policy direction and in some cases, even oppose
it, because it would disgruntle the majority of voters in their rural constituencies.
Consequently, bureaucrats were the sloe advocates for this factor.
From the viewpoint of the relationship to the market mechanism, an attempt to
introduce this factor is incompatible with a natural tendency under a freer market in the
context of Japanese rural society. Most part-time farmers can obtain a sufficient amount
of income by their off-farm earnings, so price-cuts of agricultural products do not cause
them suffer severe problems, while full-time farmers suffer greatly. Thus, the most
vulnerable class to market competition, especially in rice production, is full-time
farmers. If bureaucrats attempt to introduce the “share of full-time farmers” factor, they
would be required to overcome the resistance derived from the natural tendency of the
market mechanism.
Behaviors of interest groups and bureaucrats
As previously mentioned, it is suspected that farmers’ grievances against compulsory
set-aside duty are transmitted from village level to government level, and political
pressure is in turn placed on bureaucrats. The next question to be clarified is how the
political pressure is formed and how bureaucrats respond to this pressure.
It is widely observed not only in Japan but also in other developed countries that
farmers as an interest group show an outstanding solidarity and exert political power to
advocate for themselves. In usual cases, such political power would be exerted against
other groups including the industry sector, consumer groups and tax payers. However,
in this case, political power is exerted within agricultural sector, among regions.
It is commonly preconceived among general people in Japan, even among
researchers, that the allocation among prefectures in the rice set-aside program is a