Co-ordinating European sectoral policies against the background of European Spatial Development



Formally the Commission has no right to decide concrete measures in the field of spatial
planning or spatial development. On the other hand Community sectoral policies as transport,
environmental, agriculture and particularly structural policy are developing undoubtedly
spatial impacts both in the whole European Union and the member states. This leads to the
situation that, although there is no formal competence for spatial development on European
level, European spatial development is steered by sectoral fiscal instruments. These are
neither co-ordinated in terms of their spatial impacts, no are they oriented along spatial
criteria. Why then not simply give the competence for spatial development to the European
Commission in order to improve this situation and create appropriate conditions for a
comprehensive and real spatial development policy on European level?

To answer this question it is of great importance to gain insights in both the political
background of the discussion concerning the responsibility for European spatial development
and the varying aspects of this responsibility (cp. Schafer 2003, 26-30).

First, regarding the political background is has to be stated that member states positions so far
were not at all homogenous or concerted. This seems to be even more the case since the
recent enlargement of the European Union. Particularly the Federal Republic of Germany
stressed that spatial development is solely a matter of nation-state decisions. As a
consequence a
European spatial development policy will under no circumstances be
supported. This strictly position can be explained by the federal organisation and the related
powers as well as the long tradition in the field of spatial development in Germany.

Second, in order to seriously discuss the competency issue it has to be divided into three sub-
issues: the co-ordination competence, the competence of the content and the spatial
observatory competence.

As written above the present non-co-ordination of spatially relevant sector policies causes
frictional losses. This is a fact and is regularly criticised by both the European Parliament and
the EU member states. Consequently, and some member states’ positions notwithstanding,
this competence should be transferred to the European level. In this context another question
is of immediate interest: It might be the case that the European Commission already has the
co-ordination competence out of her organisational power. One can certainly be of the
opinion that with the competence for the sector policies the Commission also has the right and
the obligation to co-ordinate these policies in order to fulfil the defined sector targets in the
best possible manner. However, from which treaty regulation the competence for co-
ordinating European sector policies can be derived has not yet been established.

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