Fighting windmills? EU industrial interests and global climate negotiations



col could be sustained. On the contrary, Mabey et al. (1997) state that such ini-
tiatives are useless in the climate change problem. One reason being that the
main oil producing and oil consuming countries are different. If sanctioning is a
non-feasible strategy the only remaining possible way to change incentives is to
make participation in the agreement more beneficial (compared to non-
participation). It has, however, not yet been possible to identify ways of doing
this, other than trying to minimize the costs of participating, by, e.g., using a
cost efficient approach such as a tradable permit market.

In the light of this, it has been surprising to observe the EU eagerly arguing in
favour of implementing the Kyoto-agreement, in spite of the fact that the USA
rejected the agreement.
3 Furthermore, Denmark has chosen a high 21% reduc-
tion in 2008-2012 compared to 1990 emission levels. By holding on to such
high levels of reductions Denmark’s actions resemble unilateral actions, since
the total reduction of the Annex 1 countries is about 5.2% and, with the USA
not ratifying the Kyoto-agreement, even less. The excessive reduction’s by
Denmark compared to the average reductions by the annex 1 countries, is un-
dertaken in spite of the fact, that Denmark’s reductions only have a non-
significant effect on the global stock of GHG-gasses in the atmosphere.

A very concerned country might initiate unilateral actions if such actions act as
”setting a good example”. Unilateral actions appear in many areas of the inter-
national society, e.g., unilateral reductions in armaments, unilateral aid to de-
veloping countries, unilateral reductions in trade sanctions or increases of trade
concessions, and in the field of transboundary pollution problems, unilateral cut
backs in emissions. Unilateral actions to alleviate international environmental
problems have been analysed in e.g. Hoel (1991) and Barrett (1990). A rather
pessimistic result emerges in both and their conclusion is that leadership of this
kind is seldom rewarded.

3 Bush announced in March 2001 that he opposed the agreement because it largely exempts de-
veloping countries and would harm the economy. Washington Post, June 2, 2001.

11



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