Two Concerns Dominate Home Front
In my view there are two tactical concerns that will dominate the
home front. The first is the likely development of a large “war
chest” of threatened export subsidies, perhaps in the form of “mar-
keting loans across board,” if the GATT talks fail. This is what nu-
clear strategists refer to as a “credible threat,” one form of which is
MAD, for “mutually assured destruction.” The problem, of course,
is that to work, the threat must be credible; but to be credible, it
must be disastrous for all concerned. Despite these risks, I expect to
see some such threat emerge from the 1990 farm bill process.
The second tactical issue on the home front concerns what I would
call weak points in the domestic line. These weak points are defined
precisely around commodities heavily protected from foreign com-
petition by U.S. law, and thus standing to lose the most from trade
liberalization.
Uncoincidentally, these are the commodities that have the most
highly developed lobbying skills in Congress. Examples include
sugar, some parts of the dairy industry (especially outside the Mid-
west, in California and Florida), and other, smaller commodities like
peanuts. Despite the fact that the beneficiaries of these programs
are few (10,000 sugar producers receive $1.5 billion annually, ac-
cording to one recent estimate), they happen to be located in places
like Kika de la Garza’s district in Texas and in the Red River Valley
of Minnesota (Mehra).
Weak points in a line, in my view, should not be exposed to undue
fire or the entire tide of battle may be turned. I thus am inclined to
suggest an aggressive liberalization thrust at our strongest points
(feed grains, oilseeds), saving weaker commodities for subsequent
treatment. While some argue that such an approach is “inconsis-
tent,” it is far from clear that consistency is the path to reform, any-
more than an effective assault requires uniform pressure along all
points in the line.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I have described three fronts of the battle for trade
liberalization: the multilateral, bilateral and home fronts. Each is
vital to the process of trade liberalization, and each will require its
own approaches. Yet all must be planned and executed in a coordi-
nated fashion. Little wonder that trade liberalization comes slowly.
But a war is not won in a day.
REFERENCES
Barkema1 Alan, David Henneberry, and Mark Drabenscott. “Agriculture and the GATT: A Time for Change.”
Economic Review, pp. 21-42. Kansas City MO: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Feb., 1989.
Bredahl, Maury E. “The U.S.∕E.C. Growth Promoter Dispute: Tempest, Symbol, and Portent.” Economic & Pol-
icy Information for Missouri Agriculture, no. 5 (May 1989).
36