Heckscher-Ohlin one.
On the other hand, there are powerful empirical reasons for believing that interests alone may
not provide a complete explanation for the evolution of trade policy: ideas (or ideology) may matter
too. Sometimes the ideology is socialist, as in the case of COMECON, while the case oflate 19th
century Britain arguably provides an example of the power ofliberal ideology.1 In this paper we take
seriously a third possibility: that a preference for economic protectionism among voters is a function
of strong feelings of national identity and an associated set of patriotic and nationalist attitudes that
include pride in country, sense of national superiority and, at the extreme, antagonistic attitudes
towards those who are not part of the nation. Of course, nationalist ideology may have its origins in a
conjuncture between identity and group interests, and particularly in a conjuncture between identity
and perceptions of inequality (Gellner 1983); the point here, however, is that, whatever their origins,
nationalist attitudes are likely to have a certain autonomy and may exercise an independent influence
on the way in which individuals react to the opening up of trade and to other globalization issues.2
These competing explanations have radically different policy implications. If support for
economic protectionism is a function of the material interests of individuals, it can in principle be
dealt with by offering side payments that compensate for the losses that result from liberalization. For
example, in a specific factors framework workers who have been displaced from declining industries
can be given help in relocating to other sectors;3 in a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, the problems faced
by unskilled workers in rich countries can be reduced by education and training schemes that, in
1 A controversial claim, to be sure: see Irwin (1989) for one view, and Schonhardt-Bailey (1991) for
another.
2 One should be wary of oversimplifying the implications of nationalist ideology for foreign
economic policy. Shulman, for example, shows that Quebec, Hindu and Ukrainian nationalists
experience both integrationist and protectionist incentives and that policy choices depend on a
number of situational factors (Shulman, 2000). One could cite the Republic ofIreland's decision to
abandon protectionism in the late 1950s and its subsequent pursuit ofEuropean integration as another
case in point. However, the main thrust of nationalist ideology, particularly at the mass level,
probably remains autarkic; at any event this is the hypothesis tested in the paper.
3 See for example several contributions to Bhagwati (ed., 1982).