person. Indeed, on this account one who is known to have an ill will towards another
but can still be trusted not to lie would be exhibiting a Kantian morality; that is, acting
against rather than with inclination. I suggest that when we say we trust someone in this
way we make a distinction between two different senses of trust. In one sense we trust
someone to do a particular thing (so this is a type of instrumental trust for it is a means
to some specified end) in the other we trust someone because of the sort of person they
are. It might be argued that the type of instrumental trust identified here is not trust at all
but reliance - for one can rely on a deontologist not to lie but one might not trust them
to care for the goods one holds dear. In either case we might say there is actually a
threefold distinction to be made between reliance, and two discrete forms of trust: i)
trust in the context of a particular matter and ii) full trust.
This discussion points to a role for discretion in matters of trust. We use discretion to
differentiate between what we mean when we say we trust a friend and when we say we
trust a friend in some specific way or to do a particular thing. We use discretion when
we say of someone that we would trust them with our life. And we use discretion when
we decide whom to trust and in what respect. We know that those in whom we place
trust have the potential to harm us but in trusting them we trust that they use their
discretion to act in trustworthy ways in respect of the trust we have placed in them.
When we trust someone not to lie solely as a matter of principle we recognise an
absence of discretion on their part. If a trusted person cannot be trusted to act with the
discretion that comes from an understanding of why that which is entrusted to them is of
value to the trustee then it seems we are trusting unwisely. The practical application of
this is that we would be well advised to acknowledge the distinction between trust and
reliance, especially our tendency (if we have such) to mistake others’ allegiance to
abstract duty as trustworthiness. If only because while those who do adhere to duty
might be reliable in terms of that duty, they cannot be trusted not to override their
concern for our individual well-being or flourishing. It is this that leads Potter to
conclude that “In evaluating someone’s trustworthiness ... we need to know that she
can be counted on, as a matter of the sort of person she is, to take care of those things
with which we are considering entrusting her” (Potter 2002 p. 7). In coming to a view
about the trustworthiness of another we are making an assessment of their character; an
assessment, that is, of their dispositional stance towards us.
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