make no assumptions about their goodwill...” (Redding 1990 p. 66) (emphasis added).
While Fukuyama is using culturally determined differences in trust relations to illustrate
differences in the development Ofbusinesses in different parts of the world his point
readily translates to other social relationships. In addition both Fukuyama and Redding
lend support to Baier’s assertion of the relationship between good or ill will on one hand
and trust on the other. In Baier’s terms then, the assumption of the Chinese communities
is that few outside the family have good will toward one. In the European and North
American tradition trust tends to be more readily located within friendships and this
allows for an extended scope of trust that may go beyond the family, or may even
supplant the family. The point here is that while we must all allow some others
(trustworthy others we hope) to get close enough to harm us or the things we care about
we nevertheless have discretion to choose which others we will so trust. Fukuyama’s
position would presumably be that we are in fact limited in our choice in trusting
because of our cultural inheritance, but he would allow, I think, that our choices
nevertheless rest on the idea that we will trust those whom we assume to have a good
will towards us.
Trust relationships in nursing
Personal trust then comes as part of the choices that are available to us as we build trust
relationships over time with those around us. However when one becomes a patient our
experience of personal trust relationships does not necessarily provide us with the
wherewithal to negotiate a world in which we have no control over, for example, which
nurse will be looking after us. Which nurse, that is, whom we must necessarily allow
close enough to be in a position to harm us, whether we trust them or not. Nevertheless,
if we are able to, we will continue to make instant judgements about those health care
workers who present themselves as our carers. We may have a general dispositional
distrust of institutions (which might well be misplaced mistrust) and might, therefore,
not trust any health care professional with whom we come into contact; we may
nevertheless rely on them. In sharp contrast we may trust all health care professionals as
part of a faith in a background of trust in health care provision (which might be to
misplace trust); indeed, there is some evidence of a blind trust tendency of patients
(Thome and Robinson 1988). If able, we may judge one nurse to be more worthy of our
trust than another after only minimal contact reflecting our ability to make everyday
judgements about the trustworthiness of others. As Baier remarks, “... before
proceeding into the dark street or library stacks ... [we] judge the few people ... there to
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