x) That we need also to have other virtues
Potter argues here for an Aristotelian unity of the virtues. She says . .trustworthiness is
part of a family of virtues that require the development of other-regarding or altruistic
dispositions and that each of the virtues is necessary for the full expression of the rest”
{ibid p. 31). It is this point that leads her to conclude that to be trustworthy one must
have a concern for the well-being of other people that is not only authentic but is also
expressed in one’s actions and reactions (both physical and emotional) to the situations
in which people find themselves. Although she does not provide a full list of the other
virtues in this family of other-regarding virtues, it is clear that she takes her cue from
Blum’s (1980) discussion of the altruistic emotions, and includes, “...thoughtfulness,
beneficence, justice and compassion” {ibid p. 32) as likely candidates.
Discussion of Potter’s account of trustworthiness
Potter offers us a useful framework for thinking about the nature of trustworthiness, and
from which it may be possible to determine the extent to which someone is fully
trustworthy. This assumes, of course, both that trustworthiness is a virtue and that
Potter’s ten requirements provide a comprehensive account.
Potter’s ten requirements
Potter’s intention in outlining the ten requirements seems to be both to offer a guide to
the demands of ‘full’ trustworthiness and to judge the trustworthiness of a given
individual. I have already offered some critical comments while outlining each of her
requirements but the question of how far these ten requirements actually provide a
comprehensive account remains. In one sense this project is doomed to fail as there is
always likely to be occasion when being fully trustworthy requires us to act in ways that
cannot be predicted. Indeed, if trustworthiness is a virtue then it would be unusual to
expect that a set of comprehensive criteria for establishing its expression could be
compiled. The general Aristotelian assumption would be that the expression of a virtue
is measured against the good and against what a person with the virtues would do in
those particular circumstances rather than by a set of artificially constructed criteria. But
this may be to misinterpret Potter’s intent. A more sympathetic reading might suggest
that listing the ten requirements is an attempt to identify how demanding being
trustworthy is and to offer us nothing more than a guide to how we might go about
fulfilling an aspiration to be trustworthy. In this sense, Potter’s ten requirements offer us
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