Gardner has a number of concerns related to his claim that to be open-minded is to have
not come to hold a belief. He takes this to mean that someone who is open-minded
about everything (that is, generally open-minded) cannot at the same time hold any firm
beliefs. And, importantly, he claims that one consequence of this for education is:
... the recommendation that we teach children to be open-minded leads to the
prescription that we avoid ways of teaching that will promote firm beliefs and
that we teach children that it is wrong to have firm beliefs... (ibid p 40)
He recognises the desirability of being open-minded about some things but claims that
there are just too many things one cannot and should not be open-minded about. Of
course it is correct to say that there are limits to open-mindedness and more will be said
about this in due course but for now it is worth noting that Gardner’s view may be
criticized as offering a false dichotomy. That is, it takes as necessary a binary approach
to classification or to put this another way, it takes an ‘if something is not an x then it
must be ay, view of open-mindedness. While phrasing questions in this binary fashion
is appropriate for some forms of classification it is not appropriate for others. It tends to
polarise opinion and can lead to the development of impoverished accounts of
phenomena. Gardner’s claim that it is not possible to be generally open-minded and at
the same time to hold firm beliefs is an inappropriate binary classification that leads him
to hold a limited view of the nature of open-mindedness.
The following example illustrates one of the limitations of Gardner’s account. It might
be that I think it important that I should come to a view on the conditions under which
prisoners are being held in camp X-ray at Guantanamo Bay. While I may have a firm
view about the sorts of conditions that should be in place in general for those held
against their will I can at the same time remain open-minded about whether or not the
conditions in which those currently held in camp X-ray are being kept are acceptable.
Thus I may be committed to a view in general but not necessarily committed to a view
in particular (at least in this example).
For the purpose of illustration I might say that my view in general is that persons in
captivity should not have their autonomy overridden beyond that which is a necessary
component of a prison sentence. Thus while an individual may be locked in a prison cell
their movements within that cell should not be restricted beyond ensuring their own
safety and the safety of others. To tie a prisoner to the bed in her or his cell is to exceed
any otherwise legitimate restrictions on her or his autonomy of action. Or to put this
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