If we aim to be dispositionally open-minded then it is to be supposed that we must
remain open-minded about the possibility that what we count as evidence should be
extended to include things we would ordinarily reject as legitimate evidence while at the
same remaining aware of the possibility that we may be failing in open-mindedness by
becoming credulous. One problem here is that for any firmly held belief I have it may
be difficult to conceive of the nature of contrary evidence or argument. If it is true that I
am unable to imagine what sort of evidence might convince me that I am wrong in one
or more of my firmly held beliefs then I am in danger of not being able to recognise the
evidence should it be presented. This suggests that being generally open-minded
requires the use of imagination and no small amount of intellectual creativity. To aim
for open-mindedness is to strive to avoid dismissing evidence to which one should
attend and to dismiss evidence that one should avoid. As a minimum this requires
sufficient self-awareness about the extent to which one understands the limitations of
existing criteria for assessing the value of evidence.
Limits to open-mindedness
Being open-minded about firmly held and fundamental beliefs is problematic and
suggests that there are indeed legitimate limitations to open-mindedness. The problem is
not so much the idea that there are some things about which we should not ordinarily be
open-minded rather it is the question of how we are to know which things fit into this
category. This is an example of one of the difficulties of liberalism where an idea has
the potential to collapse into itself when confronted with the need to set limits to its own
tolerance. If we are to be open-minded then any criteria we use to establish the things
that we should not ordinarily be open-minded about must not be illiberal criteria for that
would be inconsistent with the idea of open-mindedness in general. The criteria must be
such that open-mindedness is encouraged rather than discouraged at least in so far as it
promotes human flourishing. As such the criteria cannot be reduced to mere procedural
rules for apart from the problem of infinite regress there will remain a need for the
exercise Ofjudgement in situations that challenge the normal everyday limitations on
open-mindedness. In addition, judgement will also be required because of the need to
remain open-minded about the criteria themselves. Any criteria set will inevitably
reflect human values and prejudices and this will require us to remain aware of the
2 For a comprehensive account of the history of science illustrating the constant struggle for acceptance of
ideas in spite what now seems compelling evidence see Gribbin (2002).
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