conception of virtue allows for what I am calling professional virtue and as such offers
the individual constrained by the fragmentation of modernity an opportunity to exercise
virtue in at least one part of her or his life. Even in this minimal conception,
MacIntyre’s three core virtues of justice, honesty and courage are given a place of
central importance. Some discussion of these three virtues as they apply to the practice
of nursing is offered in Chapter 3 but because their expression is relatively
Uncontroversial I am content to consider the discussion of these three virtues to be a
prelude to discussions about the main focus of this thesis, that is, an examination of the
place of trustworthiness and open-mindedness in nursing practice. It is not that other
virtues are unimportant; rather it is that trustworthiness and open-mindedness are
(relatively speaking) neglected in accounts of nursing despite their importance.
Trustworthiness
The NMC code of professional conduct requires that a nurse must be trustworthy (NMC
2004b) but the trustworthiness suggested by the NMC does not go beyond some
elementary notions of financial and material probity in dealing with patients belongings
and in relation to ensuring, for example, that gifts from patients do not lead to
favourable treatment for some. In this conception, trustworthiness is little more than an
injunction for nurses to practice justice as fairness, yet most nurses will recognise there
is more to being trustworthy than this. There is after all evidence of public trust in
health care professionals in general (O’Neill 2002) and nurses in particular, and this is
reflected in the public perception that it is scandalous when a nurse betrays public trust.
Despite this general recognition that nurses be trustworthy what this requirement entails
is poorly articulated. In this thesis I make an attempt to provide a preliminary
articulation of just what it means for a nurse to be trustworthy. It is not clear that
trustworthiness can be properly described as a virtue for reasons that are detailed in
Chapter 4 and because of this it is appropriate, I believe, to consider that, in terms of
virtue, trustworthiness is best conceived as a professional virtue.
Open-mindedness
It is generally accepted in the health and social care disciplines (and elsewhere) that
practice should be based on evidence. This emphasis on evidenced-based practice brings
with it some problems which, to date, remain unresolved. One of the most pressing,
perhaps, is in determining what counts as legitimate evidence, or rather, what evidence
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