living well and on what it means to flourish qua human2.1 cannot consider this
literature in detail but as the thesis has drawn extensively on a MacIntyrean framework
it is important to address his account of human flourishing, not least because of the
problems it seems to present for (some aspects of) nursing as a practice. In addition, any
account of human flourishing will give weight to the place of independent practical
reasoning in a flourishing human life and, as this is problematic for nursing, it needs to
be addressed.
MacIntyre (1999) offers an essentially Aristotelian account in which a teleological
sociology where human goods are intimately related to human action, choices and
character is emphasised. MacIntyre stresses ‘independent practical reasoning’ as the
capacity necessary for human flourishing and in so doing, he seems to suggest that
individuals who have a reduced capacity for independent practical reasoning cannot
flourish; although he does say that this is not his intention. In this section I explore some
of these issues before suggesting how those who would otherwise be excluded by
MacIntyre’s description can be included as candidates for human flourishing.
MacIntyre’s account of human flourishing
Following Aristotle, MacIntyre (1999) provides a teleological account of human
flourishing. Both consider that a good human life is one in which an individual makes
proper use of their essentially human capacities in pursuing a life in harmony with those
capacities. This requires a life that is both good for the individual as well as good for
others. While reminding us that we tend to forget our fundamentally animal nature,
MacIntyre argues that the essentially human capacity necessary for human flourishing is
independent practical reasoning and it is this that distinguishes human from non-human
animals. In the pursuit of goods we necessarily make choices and because this is
characteristic of human beings it explains why we need to engage with our capacity for
practical reasoning if we are to flourish qua humans. We make use of practical
reasoning when we choose to pursue one particular good in relation to one particular
practice recognising as we choose that this may be at the cost of failure in the pursuit of
other goods. For MacIntyre learning to make choices of this kind is learning to exercise
the capacity for independent practical reason. It is what allows us to separate ourselves
from our desires and to make predictive evaluations about the consequences of different
courses of action. These are choices that reflect our capacity to understand that we can
2 See for example: Parfitt (1984), Griffm (1986, 1996), Raz (1986), Paul et al. (1999).
73