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pressures would have affected OCR had it not been subsidised by its Cambridge
parent.
What this quasi- or controlled market in qualifications has certainly demonstrated is
that it is not a profitable enterprise. Two of the three boards have required external
financial backing to make up for the inevitable shortfalls, which leaves a question
mark over the future of AQA, still trying to survive on fee income alone. This may
mean that the state will have to step in and take actual rather than virtual control. A
fruitful area for future research is the whole question of the costs of the English
examining system. Despite regular complaints by headteachers or critics of the
examining boards, it is extraordinary that there has been no systematic investigation
of the system’s finances.
Moves to unify the regulatory bodies - from SEAC to SCAA to QCA - resulted in
each instance a shift to greater control over the boards, with QCA’s powers becoming
statutory and therefore not subject to any form of objection by the Boards below the
level ofjudicial appeal. This increased central control was exercised directly in 1997
to require the boards to unite with a vocational awarding body if they wished to retain
accreditation as providers of English qualifications. In each of the three resulting
awarding bodies the process of unification has involved stresses which interfered with
their ability to function effectively, adding to the financial pressure referred to above.
With an ever-stronger regulator, the Boards’ professional expertise - which would
weigh heavily as their greatest asset in a genuine market - proved to carry no weight.
When they objected to the proposed weighting of AS∕A2 marks in the design of
Curriculum 2000, their professional judgement was ignored. When the inevitable