The name is absent



282


ORIGIN OF TOWN COUNCILS


and the practice of Southampton at the end of the thirteenth
century, where the twelve were elected by the community at
Michaelmas, at the same time as the town clerk,1 is more likely
to have been typical. It is not to be supposed that, in quiet
times at any rate, this meant unfettered popular election.
Serious responsibilities, as well as privileges, were incident to
the government of a town, and these devolved inevitably upon
the small body of more substantial burgesses, the
divites or
maiores burgenses.2 With the increasing prosperity and poli-
tical unrest of the second half of the thirteenth century, it
is true, strong opposition was encountered in the more ad-
vanced towns from the
médiocres and minores, but it was
mainly directed against differential taxation and other abuses
of their monopoly of power.3 Attempts to use their elec-
toral power to secure friendly officers were regarded as
revolutionary.4

Except at Ipswich in 1200, at London in 1206 and at
Lincoln
c. 1300, the association of the jurés or prodes hommes
with the mayor or other chief officer(s) of the borough is more
or less strongly insisted upon, the phrase “ aiding and coun-
selling ” several times occurs and, as is well known, such a
body is often later referred to as a mayor’s (or bailiffs’) council.
At Winchester the sole duty ascribed to the twenty-four in
the clause of the Custumal defining their function is this aid
and counsel to the mayor.8 “ In this,” says the latest his-
torian of the city, “ there is no idea of administrative or legis-
lative powers . . . they are purely an advisory body . . .
their relation to the mayor is a personal one—they are his
advisers and supporters and the relation is expressed by
calling them his ‘ peers ’.” 6 Winchester, however, at the
end of the thirteenth century was comparatively advanced
in municipal constitution, the twenty-four being less an
emanation of the community than “ an estate of equal im-
portance in some matters) with the Commonalty.” 7 The

held office for life. It was evidently only a provision to keep their number
full during their term of office.

Systems of double election similar to that of Ipswich are found at
Exeter, Lynn, Cambridge, and probably elsewhere.

1 Oak Book of Southampton (Southampton Record Soc.), i. 44.

2A list of those of Oxford in 1257 contains only thirty-two names
(Cal. Inq. Mise, i., no. 238).

3 E. F. Jacob, Studies in the Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion,
1258-67,
pp. 134 ff.

4 Liber de Antiquis Legibus (Camden Soc.), pp. 55, 58, 80.

5 Above, p. 278.

β J. S. Furley, City Government of Winchester, p. 67.

7 Ibid., p. 68.

NATURE OF THE EARLY COUNCILS 283
description of some of the earlier select bodies suggests co-
operation with the chief officer on behalf of the community
rather than a merely advisory function. AtLondonin 1200-01
and at Leicester in 1225 it is the town and not the mayor
or aiderman that they are to advise. John instructs the
burgesses of Northampton to elect twelve of the more discreet
to transact their town’s business along with the mayor, not
merely to give him counsel. The twenty-four of Exeter in
1296 were to rule the city along with the mayor. At Berwick
they were elected to conduct its common affairs “ communia
. . . gubernentur ”) “along with the mayor and reeves.”
These cases seem almost to bridge over the gap to Ipswich
whose twelve
jurés were to govern and maintain the borough
in their own right,1 though the bailiffs were members of their
body. It may be added that the aidermen of London, though
they became so closely associated with the mayor, were not
created as his assistants.

The twenty-four at Great Yarmouth were a new creation,
and it was part of their duty to support the bailiffs, but they
were elected by the community, to whom the fines for non-
attendance went,2 and forfeited a large sum to the king, if
they were negligent. Their functions were primarily con-
cerned with the maintenance of the peace, and this reminds
us that, whatever may be the case with administration and
legislation, some of the bodies we have been considering had
a judicial position which does not appear to have been derived
from mayor or bailiffs. These officers presided over the borough
courts, but the aidermen of London were the ancient judges of
the Husting, and at Ipswich, Leicester, and Southampton,
and more generally at Exeter, the councillor’s duty of “ ren-
dering judgements ” is laid down without any reference to
the chief magistrates. The twelve of Lincoln, whose relation
to the mayor is not indicated, were called judges. This,
however, raises the question of origins, which will be dealt
with later.

ɪ Dr. Stephenson says that the jurats of those of the Cinque Ports which
had not mayors formed similar “ governing boards ”
(Borough and Town,
p. 1
78). But where is the evidence that the bailiff was ever a jurat during
his term of office ?
Cf. Bateson, B.C., i. 146, ii. 39 ; Statham, Dover
Charters,
p. 60.

г It is noteworthy that they were not necessarily summoned by the
bailiffs. They might themselves appoint some one to summon them
(B.B.C. ii. 368). The bailiffs are not always mentioned with them when
the " justicing ” of misdoers is in question
(ibid.}. They are called '' Ie
prodes hommes de la vile " or “le jurez
" (ibid., p. 234, 368).



More intriguing information

1. Errors in recorded security prices and the turn-of-the year effect
2. The name is absent
3. The name is absent
4. Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content
5. The name is absent
6. The name is absent
7. The English Examining Boards: Their route from independence to government outsourcing agencies
8. Qualifying Recital: Lisa Carol Hardaway, flute
9. Happiness in Eastern Europe
10. The name is absent
11. Optimal Tax Policy when Firms are Internationally Mobile
12. Three Strikes and You.re Out: Reply to Cooper and Willis
13. ARE VOLATILITY EXPECTATIONS CHARACTERIZED BY REGIME SHIFTS? EVIDENCE FROM IMPLIED VOLATILITY INDICES
14. The name is absent
15. CREDIT SCORING, LOAN PRICING, AND FARM BUSINESS PERFORMANCE
16. A parametric approach to the estimation of cointegration vectors in panel data
17. Cross-Country Evidence on the Link between the Level of Infrastructure and Capital Inflows
18. Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 11
19. Commitment devices, opportunity windows, and institution building in Central Asia
20. Measuring and Testing Advertising-Induced Rotation in the Demand Curve