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204


THE MESTA

paid by the Mesta members.1 Unfortunately, however, these
efforts had little effect because of the general weakness and in-
competence of the administrative forces throughout the realm.
Such results as were achieved at this time were attained by the
Mesta itself, dealing directly with its opponents, without the
help of the crown.

These two unfruitful reigns produced no effective restrictions
upon the abuses of local taxation privileges. Decrees like that of
1463, which ordered the forfeiture of any lands whereon illegal
montazgos were collected,2 had little or no effect. Equally inef-
fective was the steady succession of royal decrees fixing the rates
of certain local taxes and prohibiting others entirely.3 The Cortes
protested in vain against the orgy of taxation, the deputies mak-
ing their pleas partly on behalf of the migrating herdsmen and
partly to protect such feeble internal trade as had developed.
The impotent Henry was denounced in vigorous fashion for
allowing himself to be victimized by ‘ persons and universities ’
in search of illegal incomes derived from such unjust taxation of
commerce.4 The demand of the deputies that all portazgo privi-
leges conferred after 1464 be cancelled was readily granted by
the feeble monarch, who designated the clergy, and not the usual
royal officers, to enforce the decree. Since ecclesiastical establish-
ments and officials were among the chief offenders, the futility of
this procedure can be easily understood. No better illustration

1 Arch. Simancas, Diversos Castilla, no. ∏7, pt. 2 (1453).

2 Arch. Mesta, Provs. i, 3. This was aimed at powerful nobles who exacted
tolls from flocks which passed by their castles. These strongholds were quite safe,
however, in spite of the expressed purposes and penalties of the above decree, as
long as the latter bore only the meaningless signature of Henry the Impotent.

3 E.g., Arch. Mesta, B-2, Barco de Avila, 1429. Such royal prohibitions were
effectively nullified, however, by liberal recognitions of many other local sheep
taxes. A few typical instances of these are to be found in Arch. Osuna, Manzanares,
leg. 5, nos. 1, 9 (1456); Arch. Mesta, Provs. i, 8 (r462), i, 4 (1468), i, 17 (1462);
A-8, Atienza, 1461; Perez de Pareja,
Hist, de Alcaraz (1740), p. ι. Excessive and
frequent salt taxes were a favorite means of extorting funds from passing flocks
at this time. Bib. Nac. Madrid, Ms. 9378, fol. 86 (1469) : an interesting privilege
allowing the monastery of Villafranca de Monte de Oca to collect 400 sheep a year
from migrating herds for its services in feeding pilgrims bound for Santiago.

4 Cortes, 1473, S. Maria de Nieva, pet. 5.

TAXES DURING THE RISE OF THE MESTA 20$
of
the hopeless incompetence of Henry IV’s reign could be found
than this enfeebled vacillation and brazen duplicity.

As was to be expected, there were frequent attempts by the
crown to enforce the ancient Mesta charters. Two sweeping re-
newals of all previous privileges by a decree of the regency in
1407 were confirmed by John II in 1421.1 In addition to these,
which touched upon the question of local taxation along with
other topics, the regent signed a famous decree in 1413, by which
the Mesta was taken under the royal protection and “ shielded
against the abuses, maltreatments, extortions, and other harms
inflicted upon its members by priors, military orders, command-
ers, knights, bailiffs, town councils ” and many other officials
and representatives of local jurisdictions.2 Occasionally there
were efforts by the crown to check excessive local sheep taxes in
towns of the royal demesne.3 The aid of the entregadores was
constantly in demand, but their work had little effect when the
offender was some great noble or large town.4 In spite of priv-
ileges, confirmations, and entregadores, the crown was nearly
helpless as an aid to the Mesta; and the latter was forced to re-
sort to other means of protecting its members.

The device which now came into extensive use to accomplish
this end was the
concordia or agreement. This was, in brief, a
contract made between the Mesta and the individual or corporate
landowner claiming to have a right to tax the passing sheep. The
Mesta agreed, on behalf of its members, to pay a fixed toll in ex-
change for a right of way over certain lands, for the use of a bridge,
or for access to certain pools or springs. There are no instances of
such
concordias previous to this period of John II and Henry IV ;
but with the accession of the former, the Mesta lost hope of effec-

1 Arch. Mesta. Privs. Reales, leg. 2, nos. 3-5.

2 Ibid., leg. 2, no. 3 (1415); leg. ɪ, No. 5. Ibid., leg. 4, no. 4 (1441): a
decree intended further to strengthen the Mesta by compelling all shepherds in
Castile to be members — the old gild theory of all-inclusive membership.

3 Arch. Mesta, M-4, Montalbin, 1428-36: decrees freeing the Mesta from local
Portazgos at Montalbin, which was on the queen’s lands.

4 Arch. Osuna, Infantazgo, caj. 3, leg. 5, nos. 1-5 (1436 ff.); Arch. Mesta, A-3,
Alange, 1455.



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