The name is absent



88


THE MESTA

the central executive. This number was maintained throughout
the century, but with occasional demands from the Cortes that it
be reduced to four.1

Though the entregadores themselves were few in number, each
was accompanied by a large and very active company of bailiffs,
clerks, notaries, and other assistants, whose petty annoyances and
exactions of fees made the whole system of the itinerant judiciary
even more obnoxious to the townspeople. One opponent of the
Mesta in the Cortes denounced the entregadores and their nu-
merous assistants as an organization for unlimited extortion and
blackmail which supported some two or three thousand persons.2
This was something of an exaggeration, perhaps, but it was never-
theless indicative of the state of public opinion at the time when
the Mesta and its judiciary were at the height of their power.
During the succeeding two centuries the number of entregadores
gradually declined. In 1589 it had been reduced to four,8 and the
effectiveness of these was greatly restricted by the contest of the
succeeding reign. One of the conditions of the subsidy of 1650
was that the number of entregadores be reduced to three, “ until
such time as two shall appear sufficient.” This step was taken
“ because of the great decline of the sheep industry, which made
four entregadores unnecessary.” 4 Finally, in 1782, just fourteen
years before the abolition of the office, the number was reduced to
two.6

There were two main functions of the entregadores: first, to
keep open the canadas and the drinking and resting stations of the
transhumantes; and, second, to supervise and restrict the en-
croachment upon public pastures, forests, and waste lands by the
neighboring landowners and tenants. There was a third duty,
subordinate to the first two and really a part of them, namely, the
protection of the shepherds from violence and abuse at the hands

1 Certes de Castilla, ix, pp. 261-265 (1587).

2 Ibid., xiii, p. 387 (1594).

3 Concordia de 1783, i, fol. 75 v.

4 Eserituras . . . de las Senicios de Millones (1734), fol. 89. Cf. also Concordia
de 1783,
ɪ, fols. 332-333, and Danvila, “ Cortes de Felipe IV,” in Bol. Acad. Hist.,
ɪi, p. 479.

6 Arch. Ayunt. Burgos, Ms. no. 5548.

the entregador and the towns 89∙
of the local officials, peasants, highwaymen, and others. The
actual work of protecting the herdsmen in their migrations was in
the hands of certain guards, called
caballeros, who were under the
direction of the entregadores.1 The guards were detailed partic-
ularly to
look after certain marauders known as golfines, who
were usually brought before the entregadores for trial because
of their roving habits and their depredations on the transhu-
mantes.2 Lesser duties, such as the disposal of
mostrencos, or
strays, were sometimes performed by the entregadores, but their
chief task was the maintenance of unobstructed highways and
pastures for the flocks.

The duties of the entregadores with reference to the canadas
were specified in the Mesta charter of 1284:

. . . they shall keep open the canadas and the highways, and shall make
seizures for any trespass on them by those who cultivate them or enclose
them ; and the measure of the
canadas shall be six sagas de marco at forty-
five
palmos to each soga. This measure has reference to the canada where
it passes through vineyards and grain fields; and the entregadores shall so
mark and maintain it.3

l Cf. Quad. 1731, pt. i, pp. 6-7. The title was frequently applied to rural peace
officers, such as the
caballeros de la sierra in the Ordenanzas de Granada de 155г
(Granada, 1672), fol. 7, and in the Ordinaciones de Albarrazin (1647), p. 55. Of a
similar nature were the
montanneros of Soria, described in its fuero of 1190-1214
fcf. Galo Sanchez,
Sobre el Fucro de Soria, Madrid, 1916, and Loperraez Corvalan,
op. cit., iiɪ, p. 102), the guardas de huerlas of Saragossa in the Ordinaciones de Zara-
goza
(1693), fol. 189, and the guardas del verde in the Ordenanzas de Badajoz (1767),
p. 18. These rural guards were the forerunner of the modern Spanish
guardia
civil
and the Mexican rurales.

t Cf. Arch. Osuna, Béjar, caj. i,no. 5: acêdulaof 1292, directing the entregadores
to check the “ dafio y fuerzas y otros malos ɪnuehos de Ios golfines ” ; Palacio,
Docs.
Arch. Madrid,
i, p. 146: an Ordenamienlo of 1293 regarding “ el danno que Aissieren
Ios golffines a Ios pastores.” The entregadores were strictly forbidden to assess the
neighboring towns for any damage suffered in their vicinity by the Mesta at the
hands of golfines; cf. Acad. Hist., Ms. 12-19-3/38, fol. 55. The Military Order of
Calatrava collected fees from Mesta flocks for the suppression of
goljines∙, cf. Bull.
Ord. Milit. Calat.,
pp. 201-202 (privilegi< de 1343). Further details on this class
of marauders are to be found in the
Revista Penitenciaria, ii, pp. 645-662 (1905);
Revista de Extremadura, x, pp. 369 ff. (1908); and in Bonilla y San Martin’s au-
thoritative note in the
Revue hispanique, xii, pp. 602-603 (19o5)∙

’ Quad. 1731, pt. i, p. 20. This measure equalled about 250 feet: cf. Nov.
Recop.,
lib. 7, tit. 27, ley 5, cap. 22, and ley ɪɪ, cap. 9; Manuel G6mez Valverde,
El Consulter del Ganadero (Madrid, 1898), p. 243.



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