country, and is well known. The next is the Rawaj-ul-Mulk, or common law and custom of
the kingdom, equivalent to our common law. Therefore they have laws from more sources
than we have, exactly in the same order, grounded upon the same authority, fundamentally
fixed to be administered to the people upon these principles.
The next thing is to show that in India there is a partition of the powers of the government,
which proves that there is no absolute power delegated.
In every province the first person is the Subahdar or Nazim, or Viceroy: he has the power of
the sword, and the administration of criminal justice only. Then there is the Dewan, or High
Steward: he has the revenue and all exchequer causes under him, to be governed according
to the law and custom and institutions of the kingdom. The law of inheritances, successions,
and everything that relates to them, is under the Cadi, in whose court these matters are
tried. But this, too, was subdivided. The Cadi could not judge, but by the advice of his
assessors. Properly in the Mahomedan law there is no appeal, only a removal of the cause;
but when there is no judgment, as none can be when the court is not unanimous, it goes to
the general assembly of all the men of the law. There are, I will venture to say, other
divisions and subdivisions; for there are the Kanongoes, who hold their places for life, to be
the conservators of the canons, customs, and good usages of the country: all these, as well
as the Cadi and the Mufti, hold their places and situations, not during the wanton pleasure
of the prince, but on permanent and fixed terms for life. All these powers of magistracy,
revenue, and law are all different, consequently not delegated in the whole to any one
person.
This is the provincial constitution, and these the laws of Bengal; which proves, if there were
no other proof, by the division of the functions and authorities, that the supreme power of