Freedom of
discussion.
Never in-
fi inged by
a hasty dis-
solution.
Security
against in-
fringement
by compul-
sion used to
particular
members.
508 Constitutional History. [chap.
the reigns of Richard II and Henry IV. The punishment of
Haxey was annulled as a violation of the liberties of the com-
mons’ : Sir Arnold Savage prayed, but in no very humble
tones, that Henry IV would not listen to representations of
what the commons were doing ; and the king promised to
credit no such reports2. A few years later, in his undertaking
to hear the money grants from the speaker only, he declared
that both lords and commons were free to debate on the con-
dition of the kingdom and the proposed remedies3. But the
very nature of an English parliament repelled any arbitrary
limitation of discussion, and the obsequious apology of the
commons for allowing Haxey’s bill to pass- may be said to
stand alone in our early annals. The debates were certainly
respectful to the kings; of their freedom we can judge by
results rather than by details. The commons could speak
strongly enough about misgovernment and want of faith ; and
the strongest kings had to bear with the strongest reproofs. In-
terference with this freedom of debate could only be attempted
by a dispersion of parliament itself, or by compulsion exercised
on individual members. Of a violent dissolution we have no
example ; the country was secured against it by the mode of
granting supplies. The compulsion of individual members
comes under the second sub-division of this head. Of inter-
ference of one house with the debates of the other we have no
medieval instances.
That individual members should not be called to account for
their behaviour in parliament, or for words there spoken, by
any authority external to the house in which the offence was
given, seems to be the essential safeguard of freedom of debate.
It was the boon guaranteed by the king to the speaker when
he accepted him, under the general term, privilege ; and has
1 ‘ De volante du dit roy le dit Thomas estoit adjugez traitour, et for-
faita toutz q’il avoit, encontre droit et la cuise quel avoit este devant en
parlement Rot. Pari. iii. 430 : it was also 1 en anientisement des eus-
tûmes de lez communes ib. p. 434 : and the petition requires his resto-
ration t si bien en accomplissement de droit corne pur salvation des Iibeitez
de lez ditz coininunes.’ The reference to the commons is not repeated in
the act of rehabilitation ; p. 430.
2 See above, p. 30. j See above, p. 63.
XX.] Questions of Privilege. 509
since the reign of Henry VIII been explicitly demanded on the
occasion1. The power of the crown to silence or punish a
hostile or too independent member, however opposed that
power may be'to the spirit of the constitution, is better illus-
trated in medieval precedent than the power of the parliament
to resist the breach of privilege. Three prominent instances instances of
_ , , i arιest of the
stand out at three important epochs, in which the speaker speaker,
himself, or the person who fulfilled the duties that afterwards
devolved on the speaker, was made the scapegoat of the house
of commons. In 1301, after the parliament of Lincoln, at Henry
which he had been outrageously worried by the opposition of κel=ldey,
the estates, Edward I sent to the tower Henry Keighley, the
knight who had presented to him the bill of articles drawn up
in the name of the whole community2. We learn from his own
letter on the subject that the measure was dictated by policy
rather than by vindictive feeling; the prisoner was to be
kindly treated and made to believe that mercy was shown him
at the instance of the minister whom he had attacked. There
is no record of any action taken either in or out of parliament
for his release, but he is soon after found in public employment
as a commissioner of array and justice of assize. The second Pθter de Ja
case is that of Peter de la Mare, the prolocutor of the Good
Parliament of 1376, who was thrown into prison by John of
Gaunt for his conduct in that assembly3. The arrest, although
prompted by a faction, must have been executed in the form
of law. The vindication of Peter de la Mare was undertaken,
not by the parliament, which was indeed defunct, but by the
citizens of London, who rose in tumult and demanded for him
a fair trial; in the succeeding parliament, which was elected
under the influence of John of Gaunt, a minority of the knights
made an attempt to obtain his release and a legal trial. He
remained in prison until the death of Edward III, was released
by Richard II, and almost immediately elected speaker in the
first parliament of that king. The third case is that of Thomas
1 See above, pp. 471, 472.
2 See vol. ɪi. p. 157, and above, p. 470.
3 See vol. iɪ. pp. 456, 462.