(*)
Table 1: Comparison of experimental designs
Matching |
Anonymity |
Designs |
Global |
Strategy type Reactive |
Targeted |
Fixed |
NO |
Partner-not in this study |
(i) |
(i) |
(i) |
Random |
No |
Public monitoring |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Yes |
Anonymous public monitoring |
Yes |
Yes | ||
Yes |
Private monitoring |
Yes | |||
Yes |
Private monitoring with |
High |
Yes Medium |
(ii) Low | |
power Not selective |
power |
power |
Table 2: The stage game
(A) Notation in the theoretical analysis
Player 1/ |
Y |
Z |
Y |
У, У |
Th |
Z ~ |
h, l ' |
z, z |
(B) Parameterization of the experiment
Player 1/ |
Y |
Z |
Y |
25, 25 |
573ô |
Z |
3075 |
10, 10 |
The stage game. The stage game is a standard prisoners’ dilemma with payoffs
determined according to Table 2 (payoffs to column and row players, respectively).5 We
call action Y cooperate and action Z defect. So, we say that there is cooperation in the
(*) (i) In partner, the distinction among targeted, reactive, and global strategies is irrelevant because of the
fixed matching. (ii) One could interpret the possibility of personal punishment as a form of targeted
strategy, although the personal punishment reduces the continuation payoffs for the punisher more than
with the reactive strategy. Personal punishment expands the set of strategies. In particular it allows for a
targeted strategy because an agent can punish his opponent after observing the choice of his opponent.
5 We selected this parameterization as it scores high on the indexes proposed by Rapoport and Chammah
(1965), Roth and Murnighan (1978), and Murnighan and Roth (1983) that correlate with the level of
cooperation in the indefinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma in a partner protocol. Also, in Table 2 we have
0≤ l < z < y < h and 2z < l+h <2y .
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