maximising collective welfare; an obvious example is the education of girls which
could have considerable impact on child nutrition, infant mortality and population
growth, but low apparent rates of return if most women marry early and do not play an
active part in the wage economy. Similarly the economic returns to achieving universal
literacy for the last to achieve literacy are likely to be low, but the social utility may be
high in reducing malnutrition and disease. The kind of conflicts that may arise are
described by game theorists as the "tragedy of the commons - what is in the interests of
the individual is not in the interests of the collectivity (Hardin 1968). Enhanced
accountability also presumes that parents and pupils can discriminate between high and
low quality educational services. Amongst those who have not had significant
schooling this seems unlikely; even amongst those who have, the quality of what they
themselves received may result in ill informed conclusions concerning the value of
different methods of teaching and learning.
As noted above charging user fees is likely to have a disproportionate impact on poor
families. Such families generally have more members of school age, have less
disposable income and experience greater fluctuations from year to year in income than
do rich families. They are more likely to be risk averse in investing in education. Real
per capita income in more than half the countries in Africa is less than it was ten years
ago. User fees are therefore likely to discourage regular enrolment amongst the poorest
and adversely affect the enrolment of girls from poor families where they are in
competition for declining family income. It may not only reduce access but also
contribute to continued poverty since it will exclude the poorest from job opportunities
that require educational qualifications which in all societies are positively correlated
with income.
Where user fees are encouraged they may also have an unequal impact on levels of
provision. Institutions with relatively wealthy catchments may generate sums
substantially in excess of those which they are obliged to recover. This increases the
differences between schools in ways which favour the already advantaged. Thus in Shri
Lanka, fee income varies widely between schools. In a sample of 252 schools in 1988
37% collected no fees. As many as 78% of the schools that did collect fees averaged
less than 10 Rupees per child - less than one third what would have been collected had
all pupils paid the full amount. The remainder collected amounts approaching the
theoretical maximum. School development society income varied even more widely.
Over 46% of schools had no such funds, two thirds of the remaining schools collected
about 10 Rupees per child, but five well known schools exceeded 100 Rupees per child
(Lewin with Berstecher 1989:65).
These are serious objections which need careful consideration before policy decisions
are taken. Several authors (e.g. Meesook 1984, Thobani 1983) have argued that some of
the most detrimental effects of introducing or increasing user fees on the poorest groups
can be offset by sliding scales of charges related to levels of family income. However,