Rent Dissipation in Chartered Recreational Fishing: Inside the Black Box

insufficient to satiate anglers’ consumptive desires, in which case the entirety of harvest is
landed and μ₁ > 0.

The necessary condition for angler density is:

D^*

∫∣MBh (■)HqqN + MB_sSn ]dD - Nv
0

( D * ^λ∣

⁺μιHqq_N ⁺ μ2 тт-гт I = ^λD ^φHqqN■

^N_vN² )

Interpretation of this expression is a bit complicated, but aided by substituting (11) into (13)

D^*    DMAX

(realizing that-----= = MAX ) and collecting terms:

N_vN² N

, *

D

∫M¾ (■) HqN + MBsSn ] dD + -V- [( w_lMv ) D_utχ- + ( 'z_p ) + Ψ]
0N

*

+ μ₁ H_qq_N = λD φH_qq_N ■

Note that the dynamic effect of an increase in angler density, the right hand side of (14), is
negative, implying a benefit from an increase in angler density due to its adverse effect on an
angler’s harvest efficiency and thus fishing mortality. This implies that intra-vessel congestion
should be driven beyond the point where the short run return to society is maximized. The short
run marginal return (the left hand side of (14)) is intricate and can be examined piece by piece.
The first term is always negative, reflecting detriments to angler utility from the effects of
congestion. The cost effects of increased angler density consist of the reduction in variable costs
due to a decrease in the overall number of trips required to service demand and a reduction in
fixed costs (both avoidable and unavoidable) due to the reduction in vessel capital needed to
satisfy demand while maintaining full employment for each vessel.

13

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