of behavior that can be observed in the histories of numerous managed commercial fisheries
(Wilen, 2006).
VI. Conclusion
The adoption of market-based rationalization programs in commercial fisheries has been
met by a great deal of success. Fisheries that once were compressed into short and intense
“derbies” with excessive numbers of highly capitalized vessels are now conducted at slower
paces that allow fishermen to maximize the value of catch rather than its volume. New rents
have been generated both by producing higher valued products and by reducing excess inputs
and reconfiguring production. Rights based systems such as ITQs give fishermen a stake in the
health of the fishery, reducing the adversarial nature of fisheries regulation and management and
generating stewardship incentives among participants. A question arising from these success
stories is whether these same outcomes might be generated with similar programs in recreational
fisheries. Currently the answer is not clear as there is no analogous body of experience for
recreational fisheries.
In the absence of empirical experience, the alternative we pursue is to develop a
conceptual structure with which to forecast the potential sources of rent dissipation in for-hire
recreational fisheries and to gauge the likely consequences of various rationalization strategies.
An important innovation in our approach is the detailed integration of the motivations and
choices of the for-hire recreational sector within a traditional bioeconomic framework. Previous
analyses of recreational fishing have focused on angler decision making without giving heed to
the role of the suppliers of recreational trips. But understanding this supply behavior is essential
to discovering how rents are dissipated and how, after rationalization, rents may be generated
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