us to characterize the kinds of changes across different margins that would occur under various
rationalization designs.
The second section of this paper describes the framework of our model and characterizes
the optimally managed system. Section three contrasts these results with those obtained under an
open access system. The fourth section addresses how the distortions of the previous section can
be theoretically addressed through judicious choice of tax or quota instruments. The fifth section
discusses the robustness of these suggested policy instruments to violations of our modeling
assumptions and considers some real-world concerns for the “rationalization” of for-hire
recreational fisheries. The sixth section concludes the analysis.
II. A Theory of For-Hire Recreational Fishing Under Optimal Management
We begin by assuming that vessel owners supply fishing trips of a fixed and exogenous
length - say a day.5 We assume that there is a population of identical anglers whose aggregated
preferences for day trips on charter or headboat vessels conditional on their various quality
attributes are encompassed by a marginal benefit function: MB(D,H,L,S) where D is the
number of angler-days of for-hire services demanded over the fishing season, H is the per-
angler-day harvest of targeted fish, L is the amount of this daily harvest that is retained by
anglers for landing, and S is a measure of fishing trip quality that is orthogonal with respect to
the quantity or disposition of catch.6
5 This is a convenient simplification despite the real-world differentiation of charter/headboat trips into at least two
durations, half-day and day trips (with a few vessels offering overnight trips). This being said, day trips are by far
the most common offering, particularly along the Gulf Coast (Sutton, et al., 1999).
6 Although not explicitly included in our specification, demand is also influenced by other factors such as the prices
of substitute recreation possibilities (e.g. the cost of fishing dockside without chartering a vessel) and prices of
complementary goods.