The name is absent

that growers can receive it. The alternative, and more realistic, strategy for growers and
processors is to think how to make that consumers perceive the quality and are willing
to pay more for it. Creating a Quality Certified Brand could be a possibility given that it
provides consumers with a better understanding of input quality.

Acknowledgements

This paper has been supported by the SEJ2005-07341/ECON project.

This paper was edited in the context of the objectives of the CREVALOR Excellence
Research Group recognised by Diputacion General de Aragon (Spain).

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