Rent-Seeking in Noxious Weed Regulations: Evidence from US States

Rent-Seeking in Noxious Weed Regulations: Evidence from US States

He Min
Munisamy Gopinath*
Steven T. Buccola
Peter B. McEvoy

Abstract: Many non-native insect, disease, and weed pests of food, fiber, and nursery crops pose
threats to the U.S. environment, agricultural production, and exports. In this study we focus on
regulations controlling the spread of noxious weeds, especially the regulatory differences among
US states and investigate the determinants of such regulations. With a simple game-theoretic
framework, we derive cross-state regulatory congruence as a function of ecological and
agronomic characteristics and stakeholder lobbying through political contributions. Empirical
results suggest ecological and agronomic dissimilarities drive large cross-state differences in
noxious weed regulation across states. However, evidence of stakeholder interests in shaping
these regulations is found to be statistically significant. In particular, the seed industry appears
to favor more uniform regulations among US states.

Key Words: Invasive Species, Political Economy, Weed Regulation

JEL Classification: Q5, H7

Min is a Graduate Student, Gopinath an Associate Professor and Buccola a Professor in the
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, and McEvoy is a Professor in the
Department of Botany and Plant Pathology, Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon.

*Corresponding author (E-mail: [email protected], Ph: 541-737-1402, Fax: 541-737-
2563).

Financial support for the research was provided by a Cooperative Agreement with the Economic
Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture under the Program of Research on the
Economics of Invasive Species Management. The authors thank Robbin Shoemaker for his
valuable suggestions on the research project.

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