103
governments were also processing applications for land concessions outside the state farm
sector, that is, for land formerly belonging to the private colonial farms. Provincial
government officials contended that they were not granting concessions for land that was
outside the state farm sector or part of former colonial holdings—that is, they were not giving
rights to the land that smallholders had managed to retain during the colonial and
postindependence2p23eriods.' However, our research in both 1992 and 1993 calls this asser-
tion into question.
As in Sofala Province, provincial government officials in Manica in 1992 said that they
believed larger (private sector) commercial farmers were better able to exploit the province's
higher quality and better positioned lands. Consequently, they argued that state farm land
should be distributed to these commercial interests. However, unlike officials in Sofala
Province, administrators in Manica frequently stated that they were concerned about
smallholder access to land and the welfare of smallholders in a postwar Mozambique; hence,
they discussed the creation of "reserves" for smallholder farmers. At the end of the day, the
positions of the two provinces are not all that different. While officials in Sofala Province did
not appear concerned about smallholders and their prospects for acquiring rights to land, they
argued that all of the best land should be reserved for commercial enterprises. Government
officials in Manica, while reportedly concerned about the welfare of smallholders, also said
that the best land should be reserved for commercial interests. 224 One issue that begs further
investigation is the way that government officials decide who has capacity to farm—that is,
who is a commercial (private sector) farmer—and how they subsequently distribute land.
Administrators at the provincial and district levels of government spoke of the need to
reserve some land for smallholders. In 1992, these officials were discussing options for
creating "protected zones" or reserves for smallholders. Four years earlier, the Manica
Province had created the PDRM (Manica Province Rural Development Program), the initial
purposes of which were to move displaced people away from the congested corridor and
urban areas and to stimulate agricultural production. More than twenty vi2l2l5ages were created
as part of the program, most coterminous with former colonial holdings. This program was
holdings. Although the area in question is rather unimportant in this particular case, its occurrence demonstrates
how smallholders increasingly lose rights to land. In addition, all of our sources suggested that the area granted
in concessions far exceeded the official record of 4,275 hectares. See also Alexander (1994).
222. Interviews with provincial and district agricultural officers, August 1992; and provincial and district
representatives of DINAGECA, August 1992.
223. See Myers, West, and Eliseu (1993); and see below. In fact, from debate presented at the recent
Second National Land Conference it appears that provincial government officials felt it their duty to grant this
land to commercial interests because smallholders were incapable of exploiting the more productive land (Weiss
and Myers 1994; Myers and Weiss 1994).
224. This position appears to contradict our observations. While larger firms may have certain economic
advantages, we noted that several recipients of these concessions throughout the country were not investing. In
fact, many were simply speculating on the land. In contrast, smallholders in many locations were investing and
enjoying successful harvests. In Vanduzi, they boasted of substantial harvests in 1993 and looked forward to
similar yields in 1994. Many objected to problems with transport and markets, saying that some crops were
wasting in storage or being sold for low prices.
225. Since many of these holdings are reactivated or acquired by new commercial interests, it is a concern
that the villages created by the PDRM will become labor reserves for the commercial farms.