The name is absent



108

Central province, which led in the percentage of area of leases, tends to have a significant percentage
of the leases in the medium- to large-size farms: 28 percent of those in the 50-100 hectare category,
23 percent of those 100-250 hectares, 45 percent of those 250-500 hectares, 42 percent of those
500-1,000 hectares, 19 percent of those 1,000-2,500 hectares, 40 percent of the few 2,500-5,000
hectare leases, and 1 of the 4 farms over 5,000 hectares. Southern province, which also led in
percentage of the area of leases, had a significant percentage of leases for these farm sizes as well,
with 32 percent, 30 percent, 24 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent, and 1 of 4 respectively.
In keeping with our earlier findings, Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces were the most important for
leases on land 50 hectares and under. The Copperbelt had 20 percent of the 0-2 hectare leases, 7
percent of the 2-6 hectare, 36 percent of the 6-11 hectare, 51 percent of the 11-21 hectare, and 48
percent of the 21-50 hectare leases. Lusaka had 33 percent, 80 percent, 49 percent, 19 percent, and
12 percent of the leases for the same farm sizes. The dramatic dominance of Lusaka in the 2-6 hectare
size seems to confirm the hypothesis about the significance of peri-urban activity and in-filling of
registered land. The Copperbelt, which also has some sizable areas under agricultural production, had
15-25 percent of the leases in most of the larger farm sizes as well.

IX. Foreign offers

Foreign offers have been an issue of contention in Zambia. There is concern among some
government officials that the leasehold process could promote excessive concentration and a growth
in foreign ownership if the land market is fully opened to outsiders. Conversely, following 15 or more
years of nominally socialist policies, a number of Zambians are expressing the need for private capital
growth to develop the economy, and foreign investment is considered the most promising source of
this private capital. There is palpable concern from all sides, nonetheless, about possible equity
consequences of opening the land market.

Data from official transfer records indicate there may be no foundation for these fears at
present, although missing data preclude any strong conclusions. When offers are registered, the offerer
is asked to produce a national registration card (NRC),
9 the last digit of which indicates citizenship
status (see chapter 2). 10 The data on foreign ownership in table 3.16 were compiled from a computer
listing of the offers. Unfortunately, roughly 15-25 percent of the offerers in every province were
missing an NRC with the exception of Lusaka province, where 39.4 percent of offers did not have
the proper NRC codes attached. It is possible for foreigners to register land in names of Zambian
spouses or other kin which may begin to explain the large number of missing registration cards.

Assuming that only Zambians were missing their cards, no more than 2 percent of the offers
were made by non-Zambians (averaged over 1990-93) with the minor exception of Central province
(2.9 percent). Assuming the missing cards were evenly distributed between Zambians and non-
Zambians, then foreign offers would account for 12-13 percent in most provinces. With the large
number of missing cards in Lusaka, the number would rise to
18.8 percent there. In other provinces
where one percent or less foreign offers were registered (e.g., Eastern, Luapula, Northern, North-
Western, Southern, and Western), this assumption seems a bit strong, particularly when this weighting

9 In the ministry usage, "offer" refers to an application that has been approved for registration.

10 Zambians have a 1 appended and foreigners have a 2 or another digit. The data were sorted according to this criteria.
All residents of Zambia are required by law to carry these cards.



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