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1. Tenure insecurity and investment demand in Zambia
Until independence, chiefs held responsibility for all land in the Reserve and Trust areas. With
the nationalization of land after independence, the chiefs lost most of their legal responsibilities for
land allocation, although they retained some status as titular heads. The government in 1985, partly
to gain favor with the chiefs and partly in recognition of their custodianship of customary law and
rights, decided in practice that the chiefs ought to be formally consulted on decisions of leasehold
matters (SECTION v.B). Formerly, an individual wishing land, would go to his or her native village
or parents' village and ask the chief for an allocation. This process appears to be no longer possible
in many areas for two reasons.
► Ties between the urban population and the chiefs have weakened considerably with time.
Children, whose parents and grandparents are one or more generations removed from rural
life, in some cases find that chiefs no longer recognize their traditional rights to land and in
other cases simply do not want to subject themselves to the chiefs authority. Applicants are
requesting land allocations from the MOL partially for convenience, cost, freedom of control,
and the assistance they get in finding new land.
► Colonization and state nationalization of land have undermined the chiefs' role in the
customary tenure system, particularly in the peri-urban area, and further created ambiguity
regarding who holds ultimate responsibility for land allocation. Individuals seeking land to
establish a commercial farm or a game ranch are directed by the MOL to the chiefs and rural
councils. Chiefs in certain areas are willing to designate lands, but other chiefs who have seen
their control over land erode with time lack the willingness to do so. Once allocations are
made by the chiefs, the MOL still maintains the right to disapprove any contract negotiated.
Very little rigorous empirical work has been done on the issue of tenure security in Zambia.
Examples are reported, however, of people being unwilling to invest in the land because of concerns
that the chief will reallocate or sell the land of a current holder to another. Inheritance law under the
indigenous system also appears to confer tenure insecurity, in that the landholder does not have
assurance that land or property can be passed onto kin. In one case reported by his son, the father who
lived on the land for more than 20 years one day discovered that the chief had sold the entire farm
to an outsider. The son tried to register the land as a leaseholder to keep the sale from going through
but without success. Two other cases have been reported where chiefs sold large blocks (one of 56,000
hectares, the second of 14,000 hectares) of land to outside investors. In both cases the sale failed to
materialize because of the land ceiling imposed by the district authorities when the buyers tried to
register the land. Nevertheless, such occurrences can have a ripple effect on communities throughout
the region.
Some individuals, having established residences, become concerned about the possible loss of
their home and improvements in the land. The steep investments required to open new lands—land
clearing, boreholes, fencing, and buildings for livestock and place of residence—increase the felt need
for title to increase security of rights. In addition to investors' inability to acquire land, those who
manage to borrow land from fellow villagers fear that the land can be grabbed back by the owners
without notice of justification (see, for example, the following article published in the Zambia Daily
Mail, 1994).