The name is absent



50

of the area where the land is located consent in writing to the lease and that the local council must also
concur in the lease.

The appropriate size for allocation is decided according to administrative guidelines developed
within the ministry. They call for an estimation of the applicant's present and anticipated income, and
relate it to investment costs, an evaluation of the applicant's management capability, and land
availability in the area concerned. The guidelines are undated, but they envisage appropriate sizes for
ranching (2,000 hectares), mixed farming (1,000 hectares), dairy (100 hectares), horticulture (200
hectares), and small stock (100 hectares). The guidelines predate the 250 hectare limitation in the land
circular of 1985, but that limit can be and is surpassed with the consent of the minister.' The
guidelines are reproduced in annex 2.1.

Lessees can assign their leases to others or mortgage them only with the consent of the
Commissioner of Lands
(SECTION 13 of the Conversion Act). In the case of scheduled farms under
the Agricultural Lands Act, the Agricultural Land Board is required to approve such transactions, but
it is now defunct and the consent is provided by the commissioner. There is no requirement of
consultation with the chief or council.

Leasehold documents require certain development of the land by the lessee. Failure to meet
these conditions constitutes breach of the lease, allowing termination after six months' notice to the
lessee of the government's intention to terminate. The ministry appears to read these conditions as not
only requiring the initial investment specified, but the maintenance of that investment over the life of
the lease. At the same time, because of a lack of staff and transport, there is no systematic inspection
for compliance with these conditions, and breaches are commonly identified by persons seeking to
have the land taken from the lessee and made available to them.

II. Lessons from the African experience

At independence, a great many countries in Africa opted for state ownership of land and
leasehold tenure rather than freehold tenure. The latter was associated with white ownership of land
in many countries. State leasehold, if sufficiently long-term, was considered to provide adequate tenure
security and economic incentives to households for land development, while at the same time allowing
the state to maintain control of the landholding structure. To some, there were parallels to customary
land tenure, with the state assuming the role of the chief, holding land in trust for its people and
allocating it according to need (Bruce 1989).

The experience with state leaseholds has been troubled, however. The problems do not stem
from the necessary characteristics of a leasehold (since it is possible to draft a lease which is virtually
a freehold except in the most formal sense), but rather lie in the policies which are implemented
through leasehold tenure.

The National Lands Committee in its 27 April 1994 comments to this report suggested a maximum of 100 hectares
per applicant because land is limited and there is danger that chiefs become carried away with promises of development and
begin allocating large tracts to local and foreign investors.



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