The name is absent



59

V. Institutional coordination

Another reason for the poor performance of the system is that the MOL must rely on
numerous other government agencies. Difficulties in coordination with those agencies account for
considerable delay and confusion. The point is not to place blame, as too much time is already spent
pointing fingers. Rather, it is important to understand what flaws in the system lead to such great
delays.

Having to rely on planning approval and services from local authorities is a first problem area
identified by ministry staff. For the planning of stands for various purposes, the Lands Department
relies on Municipal Planning offices, where they exist, or alternatively on the Department of Town
and Country Planning in smaller towns and in rural projects such as settlement schemes. When the
Lands Department makes an offer in principle relating to an area for which a plan exists, the applicant
must obtain planning permission before a final offer can be made. This is often a source of
considerable delay over which the ministry has no control. In addition, these local authorities are
responsible for servicing plots. Unserviced plots are commonly allocated in towns, and rates are
charged even before services are provided. This has caused problems in the implementation of
development conditions, allowing leaseholders to plead the town's failure to provide services as an
excuse for nonfulfillment of the conditions.

A second problem area involves the MOL's dependence on the Ministry of Agriculture staff
for preparation of sketch plans for 14-year leases. The Survey Department cannot meet the demand
for Survey Act surveys, and in fact few holders are anxious to incur the cost for such surveys. Since
that department has failed to move quickly to develop a program utilizing less precise but more cost-
effective survey methods, the Lands Department has relied upon the staff of other ministries to
produce sketch maps. In small towns, this is the town and country planning staff, but in rural areas
they are prepared by the provincial staff of the Ministry of Agriculture, usually based in the
Department of Lands and Irrigation in the ministry's provincial office. In some areas, the preparation
of such sketch plans has become their major role. This reliance on the staff of another ministry means
that the MOL lacks control over the rate of land delivery in rural areas. On the other hand, the sketch
maps prepared appear adequate for the 14-year leases, and in fact for longer tenure. The issue appears
to be why this function, in the case of rural lands, should not be performed by the Survey Department,
rather than a section of the Ministry of Agriculture.'

Problems of coordination exist within the MOL as well, constituting a third problem area. The
Lands Department and Survey Department within the ministry have not always worked well together
to provide cost-effective access to land. In particular, the Survey Department has enjoyed a remarkable
degree of autonomy, with the surveyor general at an equivalent level with the Commissioner of Lands.
The department delayed for decades the introduction of more cost-effective methods of parcel
demarcation and identification used successfully in other countries for rural titling, such as the general
boundaries system linked to aerial photography. The Survey Department must be seen as an integral
part of the land-delivery system, as a service section for the Lands Department which actually
allocates land. In the process of decentralization, it is important that the provincial or regional offices

5 One answer is that the Ministry of Agriculture has staff posted in all districts, while the Survey Department has a
critical shortage of staff. Under current restructuring plans, consideration is being given to transferring some staff from the
land use
planning section of the Ministry of Agriculture to the Survey Department.



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