On the other hand, when an ACC gets into financial distress, the central AAC have an
incentive to protect this ACC from default because it is important to maintain the whole ACCs
system with high reputation and confidence to the different stakeholders (depositors, loaners,
Banco of Portugal, ...).
Moreover, by distributing the control rights over the ACC equally across the cooperative
members, power is actually passed to the management. Since the equity ownership structure is
exogenous, it cannot adjust to eliminate managerial inefficiency (Gorton and Schmid, 1999). And
because equity can only be traded with the ACC itself, a takeover by means of an equity
acquisition is not possible.
As mentioned earlier, understanding how ACCs governance can work on correcting bad
economic performance is of crucial importance to overcome the financial problems of ACCs and
ensure their survival. In the next section we analyse the determinant factors of ACCs governance
control mechanisms.
3. Model, data and results
3.1. Model
To analyse the determinant factors of ACCs governance control mechanisms we used a
multinomial logit model. This approach has been applied by several authors for banks (Anderson
and Campbell, 2000; Blackwell et al., 1994; Crespi et al., 2004; Prowse, 1997).
The multinomial logit is used when the dependent variable takes on more than two discrete
outcomes. In our case it assumes values of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, reflecting six different situations6,
respectively: (0) no intervention; (1) board change; (2) replacement of the chairman; (3) central
6 The values assigned to every governance intervention only reflect different categories, and the ordinal value has no
further meaning.
More intriguing information
1. The name is absent2. Keynesian Dynamics and the Wage-Price Spiral:Estimating a Baseline Disequilibrium Approach
3. Are Japanese bureaucrats politically stronger than farmers?: The political economy of Japan's rice set-aside program
4. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FARM PRICE AND INCOME POLICY PROGRAMS: PART I. SITUATION AND PROBLEM
5. Strategic Policy Options to Improve Irrigation Water Allocation Efficiency: Analysis on Egypt and Morocco
6. SME'S SUPPORT AND REGIONAL POLICY IN EU - THE NORTE-LITORAL PORTUGUESE EXPERIENCE
7. The name is absent
8. DEMAND FOR MEAT AND FISH PRODUCTS IN KOREA
9. Environmental Regulation, Market Power and Price Discrimination in the Agricultural Chemical Industry
10. The Structure Performance Hypothesis and The Efficient Structure Performance Hypothesis-Revisited: The Case of Agribusiness Commodity and Food Products Truck Carriers in the South