Gary R. Saxonhouse and Robert M. Stern
elimination of Japan’s primary government deficit, and the creation of a modest 377
surplus. In an environment of less than robust aggregate demand must be skillfully 378
managed lest Japan once again slip into a recession.4 379
380
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4 Saxonhouse and Stern (2003) discuss different proposals for introducing consumption tax
increases in ways that would encourage rather than frustrate short-run recovery.