Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime

duration Ta, uncertain promotion to the higher-income boss position thereafter, and retirement
after Tb years in office if promoted respectively. Worker i makes the choice to become an
activist if the expected income along the bureaucratic career path exceeds the income as an
ordinary worker, given his personal ability:¹⁵

Ta                            Ta +Tb                       Ta +Tb              Ta +Tb

∫(W-ω_i)e^-rtdt +π∫Re^-rtdt + (1-π)∫We^-rtdt ≥ ∫We^-rtdt

0                              Ta                          Ta                  0

Inequality (1) yields the cutoff level of disutility ω* that determines activist participation:

-rT_b

(2)       ω = ∏R - W )-^~.

erTa _{- 1}

The supply of activists - the number of workers for whom ω _i < ω^ holds under a given
contract - is then the left tail of the distribution of the disutility from the activist service:

(3)             Na^s =Z(ω^*).

Since the activists constitute typically only a relatively small proportion of the total
population, Na << 1, Z can be approximated with a linear function so that (3) becomes, Na^s =
ζω↑ where ζ is a constant. In addition, let us measure time in units of the term of activist
service, Ta, so that Ta ≡ 1.¹⁶ Then the supply of activists is expressed as:

¹⁵ Post-retirement income flows are not included in the expression, since they are identical for all
agents by assumption.

¹⁶ This approach is justified by the fact that the activist service is typically institutionalized (for
example, as a probationary period for a new party member or the length of military service for a
recruit) and its duration is fixed at least in the short run. By contrast, the tenures are seldom regulated
explicitly and its actual length fluctuates as a result of policy changes or political perturbations. Note
that a change in the term of activist service ceteris paribus translates, by rescaling the time axis, into an
increase in the rate of future discounting and a decrease in the length of boss tenure in an equal
proportion.

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