Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime



duration Ta, uncertain promotion to the higher-income boss position thereafter, and retirement
after
Tb years in office if promoted respectively. Worker i makes the choice to become an
activist if the expected income along the bureaucratic career path exceeds the income as an
ordinary worker, given his personal ability:15

Ta                            Ta +Tb                       Ta +Tb              Ta +Tb

(1)


(W-ωi)e-rtdt +πRe-rtdt + (1-π)We-rtdtWe-rtdt

0                              Ta                          Ta                  0

Inequality (1) yields the cutoff level of disutility ω* that determines activist participation:

-rTb

(2)       ω = ∏R - W )-^~.

erTa - 1

The supply of activists - the number of workers for whom ω iω^ holds under a given
contract - is then the left tail of the distribution of the disutility from the activist service:

(3)             Nas =Z(ω*).

Since the activists constitute typically only a relatively small proportion of the total
population,
Na << 1, Z can be approximated with a linear function so that (3) becomes, Nas =
ζω where ζ is a constant. In addition, let us measure time in units of the term of activist
service,
Ta, so that Ta 1.16 Then the supply of activists is expressed as:

15 Post-retirement income flows are not included in the expression, since they are identical for all
agents by assumption.

16 This approach is justified by the fact that the activist service is typically institutionalized (for
example, as a probationary period for a new party member or the length of military service for a
recruit) and its duration is fixed at least in the short run. By contrast, the tenures are seldom regulated
explicitly and its actual length fluctuates as a result of policy changes or political perturbations. Note
that a change in the term of activist service ceteris paribus translates, by rescaling the time axis, into an
increase in the rate of future discounting and a decrease in the length of boss tenure in an equal
proportion.

15



More intriguing information

1. Investment and Interest Rate Policy in the Open Economy
2. Enterpreneurship and problems of specialists training in Ukraine
3. Nonlinear Production, Abatement, Pollution and Materials Balance Reconsidered
4. The name is absent
5. Educational Inequalities Among School Leavers in Ireland 1979-1994
6. The name is absent
7. Testing Hypotheses in an I(2) Model with Applications to the Persistent Long Swings in the Dmk/$ Rate
8. The Impact of EU Accession in Romania: An Analysis of Regional Development Policy Effects by a Multiregional I-O Model
9. Proceedings from the ECFIN Workshop "The budgetary implications of structural reforms" - Brussels, 2 December 2005
10. The name is absent
11. Gerontocracy in Motion? – European Cross-Country Evidence on the Labor Market Consequences of Population Ageing
12. Constructing the Phylomemetic Tree Case of Study: Indonesian Tradition-Inspired Buildings
13. Dementia Care Mapping and Patient-Centred Care in Australian residential homes: An economic evaluation of the CARE Study, CHERE Working Paper 2008/4
14. Consumption Behaviour in Zambia: The Link to Poverty Alleviation?
15. Apprenticeships in the UK: from the industrial-relation via market-led and social inclusion models
16. Secondary stress in Brazilian Portuguese: the interplay between production and perception studies
17. Tourism in Rural Areas and Regional Development Planning
18. The Employment Impact of Differences in Dmand and Production
19. Une Classe de Concepts
20. DEVELOPING COLLABORATION IN RURAL POLICY: LESSONS FROM A STATE RURAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL