Political Rents, Promotion Incentives, and Support for a Non-Democratic Regime



economic agents: by admission of volunteers to the lowest rank of the ruling hierarchy with a
possibility of subsequent promotion to higher-paid positions. The support obtained in
exchange for the promise of deferred promotion brings about no losses (transfers to the
population). To the contrary, it can increase political rents: by recruiting agents from the
population, incumbent rulers provide an incentive for aspirants to the rent-paying positions to
volunteer extra effort, for example, in the form of supervisory services that elicit more labor
effort from the working population. In other words, the rulers can exchange obligations for
support in the national political labor market.

For the purpose of tractability, a political hierarchy can be thought of as composed of
two layers. The first layer, “bosses”, consists of the holders of governing positions (party
bureaucracy proper). The second, a larger one, “activists,” consists of the aspirants to these
positions.4 The bosses enjoy salaries and benefits well in excess of the national average, while
the activists retain ordinary jobs. The activists are required to pay dues, work more, and
render additional services, in particular, supervisory services. The incumbent elite - the
bosses - enter the implicit contract with activists, according to which the latter pay “dues” in
extra labor and supervisory services (as well as in money, e.g. party membership fees) in
exchange for the prospect of promotion. As long as the activists are content with the terms of
the contract they also provide political support to the incumbent rulers. In the short run, the
costs of this arrangement are borne by the activists. Formal admittance to the party does not

4 Formal attributes of the two groups vary across political systems and can change over time. For
example, in the early period of the Soviet regime, the distinction between the “candidates” - new
recruits on probation - and the full party members drew the formal line. As the party was growing, the
class of actual activists came to include part of rank-and-file full party members. However, the relative
positions of the two groups remained essentially the same.



More intriguing information

1. Transgression et Contestation Dans Ie conte diderotien. Pierre Hartmann Strasbourg
2. Social Balance Theory
3. Fiscal Policy Rules in Practice
4. El Mercosur y la integración económica global
5. Conservation Payments, Liquidity Constraints and Off-Farm Labor: Impact of the Grain for Green Program on Rural Households in China
6. An Efficient Circulant MIMO Equalizer for CDMA Downlink: Algorithm and VLSI Architecture
7. GROWTH, UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE WAGE SETTING PROCESS.
8. Innovation Trajectories in Honduras’ Coffee Value Chain. Public and Private Influence on the Use of New Knowledge and Technology among Coffee Growers
9. Evaluation of the Development Potential of Russian Cities
10. Contribution of Economics to Design of Sustainable Cattle Breeding Programs in Eastern Africa: A Choice Experiment Approach
11. Strategic Effects and Incentives in Multi-issue Bargaining Games
12. Regional specialisation in a transition country - Hungary
13. The name is absent
14. The name is absent
15. Climate Policy under Sustainable Discounted Utilitarianism
16. The name is absent
17. Olfactory Neuroblastoma: Diagnostic Difficulty
18. Meat Slaughter and Processing Plants’ Traceability Levels Evidence From Iowa
19. Subduing High Inflation in Romania. How to Better Monetary and Exchange Rate Mechanisms?
20. The name is absent