decision making power for married women, measured both in the women’s own reporting of how
household decisions were made and in the household’s purchases of goods typically used by
women. Notably, the effect on decision making power is strongest for married women who had
below-median household decision making power prior to the intervention. The effect is found for
four categories of decisions: expenditures on large purchases, personal items, assisting family
members, and number of children. We also find that households in which a woman was offered
the commitment product were more likely to buy durables typically used by women within the
household. We find no such effects on household durables when a man was offered the
commitment savings account.
We also find an impact on self-perception of savings behavior. Note that in earlier work we
found that time-inconsistent women (as measured through time preference questions in a baseline
survey) were more likely to open the commitment savings account than time consistent women.
Here we find that for time-inconsistent women, the commitment savings account made them
more likely to perceive themselves as a disciplined saver and to report saving available cash
rather than spending it. Thus, evidence exists to show that the commitment device had an impact
on both spousal control and (at least the self-perception of) self-control.
We also examine whether any increase in savings held by the individual in this account
reduced the overall savings held by the household. Although we cannot distinguish between the
individual crowding out his or her own savings elsewhere versus the spouse saving less, we can
test whether the commitment device overall leads to higher aggregate household savings. 4 This
is an important policy question in general regarding illiquid savings, not just relevant to an
understanding household bargaining (Feldstein 1974; 1982; 1996). Furthermore, existing
evidence on commitment devices focuses mostly on the impact on savings in the commitment
4 Indeed, commitment savings devices are thought to increase savings for present-biased discounters
(Laibson 1997).