AN EXPLORATION OF THE NEED FOR AND COST OF SELECTED TRADE FACILITATION MEASURES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WTO NEGOTIATIONS

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As noted by many respondents to the expert survey, TFMs considered may not be
implemented effectively separately, but as part of an overall trade facilitation programme
(that may include some infrastructure component). Development of standard trade facilitation
technical assistance/capacity building modules, each including a small set of related TFMs,
for which countries in need could apply, may be considered.

As the on-going unilateral trade facilitation efforts of the countries studied suggest,
implementation of TFMs has no downside for Governments, as it does not result in loss of
customs revenue, even if trade flows remain the same. The findings on implementation
costs, as well as a significant number of anecdotal evidences from inside and outside the
Asia-Pacific region, also suggest that setup and operating costs are dwarfed by long-term
savings. As such, special and differential treatment is only needed to shield developing
countries from dispute settlement until they secure the resources and build the capacity
necessary to implement TFMs.

The types of costs associated with various measures may affect the type of special
and differential treatment needed. Measures with high political costs may require differential
treatment in terms of time of implementation. Measures with high infrastructure-related
costs may require exemption until technical assistance has been received and capacity to
implement has been acquired.

An agreement on TF with non-binding commitments would make little sense in the
context of the WTO, especially since there are already a number of relatively comprehensive
non-binding international conventions on trade facilitation, notably the WCO revised Kyoto
Convention. One essential benefit from negotiating on TF at the WTO would be to agree
on a possibly very small but nonetheless existent set of TF measures to be implemented
by all WTO member countries.

However, as pointed out in some proposals submitted to the NGTF, a disagreement
on a single transaction should not lead to the triggering of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. A WTO agreement that would include commitments from member countries
on disclosure of trade-related regulations and fees and charges, combined with a set of
jointly agreed principles to govern and strengthen national level appeal mechanisms (including
time limits on issuance of rulings), would be an option. The WTO dispute settlement
mechanism would then only be triggered in case of failure of the national appeal system to
comply with negotiated principles.

Transit arrangements in many countries in Asia and the Pacific are mostly a function
of bilateral and subregional agreements. Freedom of Transit will therefore be dependent
on harmonization of these bilateral and subregional agreements, suggesting that regional
committees on transit issues, and perhaps also other trade facilitation issues, may be
needed to make progress in this area. Given the neutral role and expertise of regional
commissions of the United Nations in trade and transport facilitation, it is important that
they form an integral part of the coordinated global trade facilitation technical assistance
and capacity building that will likely be needed to facilitate implementation of the agreement.

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