Synthesis report
43
also suggest that setup and operating costs are dwarfed by long-term savings.
As such, special and differential treatment is only needed to shield developing
countries from dispute settlement until they secure the resources and build
the capacity necessary to implement trade facilitation measures.
The types of costs associated with various measures may affect the type of
special and differential treatment needed. Measures with high political costs
may require differential treatment in terms of time of implementation. Measures
with high infrastructure-related costs may require exemption until technical
assistance has been received and capacity to implement has been acquired.
An agreement on TF with non-binding commitments would make little sense
in the context of the WTO, especially since there are already a number of
relatively comprehensive non-binding international conventions on trade
facilitation, notably the WCO revised Kyoto Convention. One essential benefit
from negotiating on TF at the WTO would be to agree on a possibly very
small but nonetheless existent set of TF measures to be implemented by all
WTO member countries.
However, as pointed out in proposal TN/TF/W/82, a disagreement on a single
transaction should not lead to the triggering of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism. A WTO agreement that would include commitments from member
countries on disclosure of trade-related regulations and fees and charges,
combined with a set of jointly agreed principles to govern and strengthen
national level appeal mechanisms (including time limits on issuance of rulings),
would greatly limit the risk of such occurrence. The WTO dispute settlement
mechanism would then only be triggered in case of failure of the national
appeal system to comply with negotiated principles. Some developing countries
may need technical assistance to setup compliant appeal mechanisms, and
assistance in terms of human resource training. One interesting feature is
that the operating costs of appeal mechanisms at the national level will likely
be a function of the level of transparency and impartiality of Customs and
other agencies, thus in itself providing an incentive for further trade facilitation.
Transit arrangements in many Asia-Pacific countries are based on bilateral
and subregional agreements. Freedom of transit will therefore be dependent
on harmonization of these bilateral and subregional agreements, suggesting
that regional committees on transit issues, and perhaps also other trade
facilitation issues, may be needed to make progress in this area. Given the
neutral role and expertise of regional commissions of the United Nations in
trade and transport facilitation, it is important that they form an integral part of
the coordinated global trade facilitation technical assistance and capacity
building that will likely be needed to facilitate implementation of the agreement.