societal norms are strongly hierarchical, people assume and expect such norms in all walks
of life and would only exceptionally adopt different (e.g. COOP) norms as group members.
The connection is not watertight or inviolable: strongly dominant norms can provoke a
reaction as people challenge them. Nonetheless, the connection is generally likely to be
strong, overturned only by deliberate and sometimes costly efforts. Secondly, the prevalent
societal incentive systems may influence groups’ mode of behaviour. Since group members
are often the same individuals as meet in other relationships outside the group (e.g. family
members, members of the same firm), behaviour within the group that deviates from that
outside the group (e.g., challenging hierarchies) may be punished by action taken outside the
group. Or, strong financial incentives for outside group work may prevent group members
performing cooperatively and lead them to demand financial incentives in order to work
properly within the group (as e.g. among doctors who can earn a lot by private consultancy).
Thirdly, groups which are part of or relate to the government - e.g. via subcontracting
relationships - may be required to behave according to the norms to which the government
adheres. Fourthly, societal norms and norms within the group are likely to be influenced by
the structure of the economy, including the prevailing motivation for economic activity (e.g.
whether it is predominantly a ‘command’ economy, an economy of ‘affection’, or a market
economy) as well as the distribution of assets and income in society in general.
Much of the empirical material surveyed in Heyer et al. supported the hypothesis of a link
between societal and group norms - for example, the difference in behaviour between local
government in Bangladesh (dominated by the elite) and Karnataka (where more COOP
relations prevailed) was attributed to this connection by Crook and Manor. The successful
Village Councils in South India, described by Wade, which performed efficiency functions,
adopted modes of behaviour broadly consonant with the norms of the villages in which they
were located, with elements of hierarchy, incentives and cooperation. The ‘failure’ of some
local organisations, reviewed by Esman and Uphoff, appeared to be due to conflict with
societal norms: for example, women’s organisations in Korea that challenged male
hierarchies and land reform organisations that opposed powerful landlords. The organiser of
a mothers’ club in Korea was beaten, with the justification that “misfortune will fall upon the